“In 1900 there was not a single country in the
world that would qualify as a democracy by today’s standards.
As of January 2000, there were 120 democracies,
the highest number in the history of the world”.
Larry Diamond (“A report Card”, April 15th, 2006).
Nowadays looking at the geographic area that the USSR used to cover someone can see 15 different countries. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (former USSR countries) together with Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, FYROM, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, share a “common starting point” (Gill, 2002, p.9). Their common starting point is the fall of communism. At the present day, eight of them are members of the European Union while nine of them are still defined as “non democracies” (Gill, 2002, p.10). All these countries were framed under the soviet model and “shared a number of political characteristics” (Gill, 2002, p.11) such as: “a highly penetrative system and a totalistic conception of politics”. These characteristics among other needed to be reformed in the transition period.
Many scholars, commentators and politicians were highly concerned with the transition process of the former communist countries as long as the process was related with important issues like democracy, human rights, political rights, civil liberties and other. This essay will focus its analysis in two entirely different countries: Hungary, member of the European Union since 2004 and Belarus, a non-democratic country that still face great difficulties in its democratisation process. Fish (2002) cited by Gill (2002, p.12) grounded his analysis on the post-communist countries in “three explanatory variables”, the same variables that will be used in this essay:
Ÿ “the extent of the country’s economic reform: the greater the economic reform, the greater the democratization
Ÿ the extent to which the constitution concentrates power: the greater the concentration, the less the democracy, and,
Ÿ the development of autonomous societal organisation” (Gill, 2002, p.12).
At the first part of this essay an effort will be made to define the democratic context of Hungary and Belarus. Furthermore, the second part of this essay will identify the key problems of the transition period, while the conclusion will try to signify key issues that played an important role in the transition process of Hungary and Belarus.
“Transition is usually meant to refer to a change in a country’s institutional system, that is, a set of domestic institution and the related mechanisms of individuals interactions such as the elections” (Balcerowicz, 2002, p.17). As Balcerowicz wrote “political transition refers to the changes in the role and structure of the state and its democratisation” (2002, p.18). Despite the fact that Hungary and Belarus gained their independence from the Soviet Union in the early ninety’s[1], the process of “normalisation took a different route in each case” (Diamond & Plattner, 2002, p.159).
Hungary is a “small landlocked country in the heart of Europe, in the Carpathian basin” (“Hungary”, April 15th, 2006 from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu). Its population is around ten million people and the official language is the Hungarian (“Hungary”, April 15th, 2006 from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu.). On the other hand, Belarus is a country east of Poland and next to Lithuania which is the geographic centre of the European continent. Its population is also around ten million people and the spoken languages are Belarusian, Russian and other (“Belarus”, April 15th, 2006 from www.indexmundi.com/belarus/.). Belarus remained politically and economically closer to Russia than any other former Soviet Republic and this choice seems to have affected its transition process (“Belarus”, 15th of April 2006 from www.indexmundi.com/belarus).
Hungary’s transition to a Parliamentary Democracy was “the first and smoothest among the former Soviet Bloc” (“History of Hungary”, April 16th, 2006). In the late 1987, when Imre Pozsgay “lent his support to the formation of an independent group” - the Hungarian Democratic Forum - major changes start occurring (Diamond and Plattner, 2002, p.157). The Hungarian Constitution that was established in 1989 (approved by the Party and the National Assembly) was based on the 1949 Constitution enriched with “a series of amendments” (Barny, 2006, pp.69-72). In the modified Constitution the post of the President was established in place of the Presidential Council and the word “People’s” was eliminated from the name of the country (Barny, 2006, pp.69-72). In Hungary “transition to democracy was the outcome of negotiations and compromises between the regime and the opposition forces” and this had a direct impact on the rapid and effective political and economic changes. Moreover as Gonenc (2002, p.134) wrote there was always “strong resistance to the domination of Moscow in Hungary”. Hungary on the 31st of March of 1994 applied for EU membership and targeted its orientation in a European path.
On the contrary, “from the earliest days of its independence” Belarus ruling elite cultivated the “idea of returning to the Russian fold” (Day, 2002, p.5). Five years after its independence Belarus[2] proceeded in a Union Agreement with “mother Russia”; according to the Agreement, “the two countries would retain their national independence after entering into a Confederal Union with each other, but would share government policies in all fields” (Day, 2002, p.5). Despite of the close relation of the two countries this agreement has not yet been put into action.
Belarus has not yet succeeded in becoming a democratic state. Sequentially events that started in 1996 stopped the country’s democratic transition. A referendum that was held in 1996 “strengthened Lukashenka’s[3] presidential authority” (Day, 2002, p.52). The Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe expressed their doubts about the results, but the harm has already been done. The same scheme repeated in the presidential elections of 2001 where Lukashenka won with the 75.6% of the vote. The “opposition parties continued to protest about the lack of legitimate mandate” but in vain (Day, 2002, p.52). The final act was played on the 19th of March 2006 when Lukashenka for the third time succeeded in staying in power and the democratic dream faded (“EU vows”, April 20th, 2006). The dictatorial regime that Lukashenka created the last decade “combines methods of soft and hard power” that have many similarities with the “martial law imposed in late 1981 in Poland” (Kucharczyk,2000, p.1).
Moreover, the extent that political rights, human rights and civil liberties among other are secured in a society proves its democratic nature. It was stated by the Freedom House during the election of 2006 that “in an effort to halt communication between Belarusian citizens and the international community, the government has arrested journalists and suspended the printing of independent newspapers” (“Freedom House calls”, April 20th, 2006). “Belarus was ranked 74 out of 146 countries surveyed in the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index” (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). In addition, the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal procedure was revised in December 2005 and “made civil society and political activism even more risky” (Suri Sanjay, April 20th, 2006); even Belarusian Courts are heavily influenced by the government (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). The political rights declined in 2006 from 6 to 7 (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhaouse.com) while “several people were arrested and imprisoned several days before the elections” (Suri Sanjay, April 20th, 2006). Even the internet access is limited in Belarus and an internal passport system “is required for domestic travel that controls freedom of movement and choice of residence” (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). The Annual Report on Human Rights refers that in Belarus:
“there is a state monopoly on the broadcast media, and the political opposition is generally denied air time on TV and radio”, moreover, “contact between state officials and the independent media is restricted” (“Annual Report”, April 20th, 2006).
On the opposite side, Hungary has transformed in a free and democratic country as soon as it gained its independence; even the early elections of the 1990 were characterised as free and fair (Gill, 2002, p.7). The period between October 1989 and the elections of March 1990 were characterized by: “i) the involvement of the broader public who were able to take part in discussions, ii) a referendum, and iii) eventually the elected non-communist government of Antall” (Cox, 1995, p.6). As Cox (1995, p.6) wrote, the public played important role in Hungary’s evolution, especially at the “stage that led to the breakdown of the political cooperation between the moderates and the reformers and helped in shaping the development of the parties”. Nowadays, Hungary’s civil liberties are rated with 1 “due to the deepening of European Union integration trends, resulting in greater conformity with EU human rights standards” (“Hungary”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). According to the Freedom House, the Courts are generally fair, while NGO’s are active without restrictions. Though one of the major problems that Hungary faces is the discrimination against Roma population that still continuous; in a governments effort to face this problem, “new commissioners have been appointed to promote equal opportunities” (“Hungary”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com)
Last but not least, economic reform played an important role in the transition period: “the greater the economic reform, the greater the democratisation” (Fish, 2002, cited by Gill, 2002, p.12). Hungary and Czech Republic succeeded to be on the top of the rank in economic reform among the former communist countries, while Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan are fourth form the bottom (Gill, 2000, p.195). The economic reform of the former communist countries concentrated on “the financial sector, the informal sector, the real estate market, privatization, tax policies and in local governments role in private sector development” (“CIPE celebrates”, April 18th, 2006).
Hungary succeeded in ten years time to reduce the public deficit, to reduce unemployment and accelerate the country’s economic growth (Commission official, April 18th, 2006). According to the European Commission in November 2001 the privatization process was almost completed and the process of economic transition reached its higher level (Commission Official, April 18th, 2006). The 2005 the Hungarian GDP was 16.100 while the real growth was 3.9% (“Hungary - CIA fact book”, April 20th, 2006). On the other hand, Belarusian economic reform was characterized by hyperinflation, falling GDP and general economic chaos (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.1). As Vorobeychik (2002, p.1) wrote, the “long awaited independence was mostly symbolic as it hardly witnessed any change, be it political or institutional”. As he pointed, the old regime was still governing the country even when democracy supposed to have arisen. The “reluctance of the government to enact radical reforms was a serious problem as both countries suffered greatly from the remnants of old institutions and relations” (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.2). However, the first years of Belarusian independence didn’t indicate its future course; Belarus benefited in the beginning from its good relations and homogeneity with Russia (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.2). It seemed that Belarus would have better future than many other former communist countries but failed to do so. In contrast to Hungary, Belarus is still facing an inflation of 200% while the GDP per capita is 7.700, less than the half of the Hungarian (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.3).
As it can be seen of the above analysis Hungary and Belarus even they had a common starting point, ended up in 2 completely different countries. One democratic state with great prospects as is Hungary and one that is still struggling for the rights of its people as is Belarus. But, which were the problems that they faced in the transition period and shaped their route? The second part of this essay will try to spread light in those important elements that drove their transition to the today’s form.
Hungary and Belarus faced various problems and difficulties in their transition period. Though, not many common characteristics exist basically because Hungary’s transition was fast in contrast with Belarus democracy that still to emerge. “In the 1990’s one of the most interesting features of Hungarian political developments was the frequent swing in the political opinion of the population” (László, 2000, p.35). Furthermore, one of the main problems that Hungary had to face in its transition effort was the “fragmentation of the political parties and their loss of orientation” (Cox, 1995, p.6). Lomax cited by Cox (1995, p.6) wrote that there was a lack of political culture as part of the “remains of the Berlin Wall in Hungary” and that the future of this country “dependent on the development of pluralist forms of behavior”.
On the other hand, Belarus seemed that it would follow a more western route. Very early the Party’s power was “shaken by popular demands form more freedom and National autonomy” (Gonenc, 2002, p.190). At the end of 1980’s “two important independent groups came into existence: Belarusian Language Association and Belarusian Ecological Union” while in 1988 the Belarusian Popular front was established (Gonenc, 2002, p.190). These early developments made the Belarusian future to seem prosperous. Though, various factors like the 1996 amendment of the Constitution by “a heavily manipulated referendum” didn’t allowed Belarus to transit in a democratic state (“Annual report”, April 16th, 2006). The referendum of 1996 “increased the power of the executive at the expense of the Parliament and judiciary”; as a result “the Parliament was disbanded and replaced by a bicameral Assembly field with presidential appointees” (“Annual report”, April 16th, 2006). As Kuzio (2002, p.4) wrote, Belarus was missing “the sociocultural pluralism, the civil society and independent economic actors when it became an independent state”. Moreover he added that some of the problems that Belarus had to face since the beginning of its independence were: “introducing political and economic reform, building institutions and forge a unified state” (Kuzio, 2002, p.4).
On the other hand, the “transition in Hungary was driven initially from the ruling elite who shared a common concern in avoiding open crisis and complete breakdown of order” (Diamond & Plattner, 2002, p.157); it was then that Pozsgay found support from several reformists and became strong enough to change the political scheme. However, Cox in 1995 (p.6) wrote that Hungary faced “a lack of commitment to pluralistic values, which was a legacy of the communist regime”; as he wrote, this could create implications in the country’s future democracy. Nevertheless as it has been proved this was not enough to stop the Hungarian democratic path.
The aim of this essay was to compare and contrast the extent of and problems involved in the democratisation of Hungary and Belarus. This essay supported that the two countries do not have any common characteristic today as they also didn’t have during their transition period. Gill (2000, p.195) characteristically wrote that “where the transition was in the hands of non-regime civil society forces, democracy has generally been the outcome; in contrast “where old regime forces remained firmly in control and were able to exclude civil society forces, non democracy has been the outcome” (Gill, 2000, p.195).
The Hungarians pushed forward the country’s transition while politicians were negotiating. The result is that today Hungary is one of the 25 EU Member-States. Its democratisation has been successfully completed and succeeded in fulfilling the necessary criteria for EU entrance. On the other hand, Belarus have failed to follow a democratic route and remained attached to Russia. The democratic forces of the country, especially after the 2006 elections, expect from the European Union and United States of America to play an active role in their struggle for freedom. It is true that Europe could take advantage of the Belarusian dependence in oil and natural gas; “such sanctions would hurt the regime and the nomenklatura more than ordinary citizens” (Kucharczyk, 2000, p.4) and might change their behavior. Though this will happen when the people of Belarus massively demand EU’s interference; the voices of Belarusian’s should become stronger and louder and then the western world might take action. When Fukuyama (cited by László, 2000, p.36) was writing about the Fall of the Soviet Union and the domination of “market economy even under socialist regime” most “observers were surprised”. Nowadays 15 years after the Fall of Communism, eight post-communist countries are members of the European Union and those that aren’t, are seeking for European help. Although no external help can provide the necessary power that a country needs to change. An internal force must maturate and lead the way of change; then the external help will come. Moreover, if a country’s democracy is established under external enforcement, it will not succeed and it will eventually collapse.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Larry Diamond (“A report Card”, April 15th, 2006).
Nowadays looking at the geographic area that the USSR used to cover someone can see 15 different countries. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (former USSR countries) together with Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, FYROM, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, share a “common starting point” (Gill, 2002, p.9). Their common starting point is the fall of communism. At the present day, eight of them are members of the European Union while nine of them are still defined as “non democracies” (Gill, 2002, p.10). All these countries were framed under the soviet model and “shared a number of political characteristics” (Gill, 2002, p.11) such as: “a highly penetrative system and a totalistic conception of politics”. These characteristics among other needed to be reformed in the transition period.
Many scholars, commentators and politicians were highly concerned with the transition process of the former communist countries as long as the process was related with important issues like democracy, human rights, political rights, civil liberties and other. This essay will focus its analysis in two entirely different countries: Hungary, member of the European Union since 2004 and Belarus, a non-democratic country that still face great difficulties in its democratisation process. Fish (2002) cited by Gill (2002, p.12) grounded his analysis on the post-communist countries in “three explanatory variables”, the same variables that will be used in this essay:
Ÿ “the extent of the country’s economic reform: the greater the economic reform, the greater the democratization
Ÿ the extent to which the constitution concentrates power: the greater the concentration, the less the democracy, and,
Ÿ the development of autonomous societal organisation” (Gill, 2002, p.12).
At the first part of this essay an effort will be made to define the democratic context of Hungary and Belarus. Furthermore, the second part of this essay will identify the key problems of the transition period, while the conclusion will try to signify key issues that played an important role in the transition process of Hungary and Belarus.
“Transition is usually meant to refer to a change in a country’s institutional system, that is, a set of domestic institution and the related mechanisms of individuals interactions such as the elections” (Balcerowicz, 2002, p.17). As Balcerowicz wrote “political transition refers to the changes in the role and structure of the state and its democratisation” (2002, p.18). Despite the fact that Hungary and Belarus gained their independence from the Soviet Union in the early ninety’s[1], the process of “normalisation took a different route in each case” (Diamond & Plattner, 2002, p.159).
Hungary is a “small landlocked country in the heart of Europe, in the Carpathian basin” (“Hungary”, April 15th, 2006 from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu). Its population is around ten million people and the official language is the Hungarian (“Hungary”, April 15th, 2006 from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu.). On the other hand, Belarus is a country east of Poland and next to Lithuania which is the geographic centre of the European continent. Its population is also around ten million people and the spoken languages are Belarusian, Russian and other (“Belarus”, April 15th, 2006 from www.indexmundi.com/belarus/.). Belarus remained politically and economically closer to Russia than any other former Soviet Republic and this choice seems to have affected its transition process (“Belarus”, 15th of April 2006 from www.indexmundi.com/belarus).
Hungary’s transition to a Parliamentary Democracy was “the first and smoothest among the former Soviet Bloc” (“History of Hungary”, April 16th, 2006). In the late 1987, when Imre Pozsgay “lent his support to the formation of an independent group” - the Hungarian Democratic Forum - major changes start occurring (Diamond and Plattner, 2002, p.157). The Hungarian Constitution that was established in 1989 (approved by the Party and the National Assembly) was based on the 1949 Constitution enriched with “a series of amendments” (Barny, 2006, pp.69-72). In the modified Constitution the post of the President was established in place of the Presidential Council and the word “People’s” was eliminated from the name of the country (Barny, 2006, pp.69-72). In Hungary “transition to democracy was the outcome of negotiations and compromises between the regime and the opposition forces” and this had a direct impact on the rapid and effective political and economic changes. Moreover as Gonenc (2002, p.134) wrote there was always “strong resistance to the domination of Moscow in Hungary”. Hungary on the 31st of March of 1994 applied for EU membership and targeted its orientation in a European path.
On the contrary, “from the earliest days of its independence” Belarus ruling elite cultivated the “idea of returning to the Russian fold” (Day, 2002, p.5). Five years after its independence Belarus[2] proceeded in a Union Agreement with “mother Russia”; according to the Agreement, “the two countries would retain their national independence after entering into a Confederal Union with each other, but would share government policies in all fields” (Day, 2002, p.5). Despite of the close relation of the two countries this agreement has not yet been put into action.
Belarus has not yet succeeded in becoming a democratic state. Sequentially events that started in 1996 stopped the country’s democratic transition. A referendum that was held in 1996 “strengthened Lukashenka’s[3] presidential authority” (Day, 2002, p.52). The Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe expressed their doubts about the results, but the harm has already been done. The same scheme repeated in the presidential elections of 2001 where Lukashenka won with the 75.6% of the vote. The “opposition parties continued to protest about the lack of legitimate mandate” but in vain (Day, 2002, p.52). The final act was played on the 19th of March 2006 when Lukashenka for the third time succeeded in staying in power and the democratic dream faded (“EU vows”, April 20th, 2006). The dictatorial regime that Lukashenka created the last decade “combines methods of soft and hard power” that have many similarities with the “martial law imposed in late 1981 in Poland” (Kucharczyk,2000, p.1).
Moreover, the extent that political rights, human rights and civil liberties among other are secured in a society proves its democratic nature. It was stated by the Freedom House during the election of 2006 that “in an effort to halt communication between Belarusian citizens and the international community, the government has arrested journalists and suspended the printing of independent newspapers” (“Freedom House calls”, April 20th, 2006). “Belarus was ranked 74 out of 146 countries surveyed in the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index” (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). In addition, the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal procedure was revised in December 2005 and “made civil society and political activism even more risky” (Suri Sanjay, April 20th, 2006); even Belarusian Courts are heavily influenced by the government (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). The political rights declined in 2006 from 6 to 7 (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhaouse.com) while “several people were arrested and imprisoned several days before the elections” (Suri Sanjay, April 20th, 2006). Even the internet access is limited in Belarus and an internal passport system “is required for domestic travel that controls freedom of movement and choice of residence” (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). The Annual Report on Human Rights refers that in Belarus:
“there is a state monopoly on the broadcast media, and the political opposition is generally denied air time on TV and radio”, moreover, “contact between state officials and the independent media is restricted” (“Annual Report”, April 20th, 2006).
On the opposite side, Hungary has transformed in a free and democratic country as soon as it gained its independence; even the early elections of the 1990 were characterised as free and fair (Gill, 2002, p.7). The period between October 1989 and the elections of March 1990 were characterized by: “i) the involvement of the broader public who were able to take part in discussions, ii) a referendum, and iii) eventually the elected non-communist government of Antall” (Cox, 1995, p.6). As Cox (1995, p.6) wrote, the public played important role in Hungary’s evolution, especially at the “stage that led to the breakdown of the political cooperation between the moderates and the reformers and helped in shaping the development of the parties”. Nowadays, Hungary’s civil liberties are rated with 1 “due to the deepening of European Union integration trends, resulting in greater conformity with EU human rights standards” (“Hungary”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). According to the Freedom House, the Courts are generally fair, while NGO’s are active without restrictions. Though one of the major problems that Hungary faces is the discrimination against Roma population that still continuous; in a governments effort to face this problem, “new commissioners have been appointed to promote equal opportunities” (“Hungary”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com)
Last but not least, economic reform played an important role in the transition period: “the greater the economic reform, the greater the democratisation” (Fish, 2002, cited by Gill, 2002, p.12). Hungary and Czech Republic succeeded to be on the top of the rank in economic reform among the former communist countries, while Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan are fourth form the bottom (Gill, 2000, p.195). The economic reform of the former communist countries concentrated on “the financial sector, the informal sector, the real estate market, privatization, tax policies and in local governments role in private sector development” (“CIPE celebrates”, April 18th, 2006).
Hungary succeeded in ten years time to reduce the public deficit, to reduce unemployment and accelerate the country’s economic growth (Commission official, April 18th, 2006). According to the European Commission in November 2001 the privatization process was almost completed and the process of economic transition reached its higher level (Commission Official, April 18th, 2006). The 2005 the Hungarian GDP was 16.100 while the real growth was 3.9% (“Hungary - CIA fact book”, April 20th, 2006). On the other hand, Belarusian economic reform was characterized by hyperinflation, falling GDP and general economic chaos (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.1). As Vorobeychik (2002, p.1) wrote, the “long awaited independence was mostly symbolic as it hardly witnessed any change, be it political or institutional”. As he pointed, the old regime was still governing the country even when democracy supposed to have arisen. The “reluctance of the government to enact radical reforms was a serious problem as both countries suffered greatly from the remnants of old institutions and relations” (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.2). However, the first years of Belarusian independence didn’t indicate its future course; Belarus benefited in the beginning from its good relations and homogeneity with Russia (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.2). It seemed that Belarus would have better future than many other former communist countries but failed to do so. In contrast to Hungary, Belarus is still facing an inflation of 200% while the GDP per capita is 7.700, less than the half of the Hungarian (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.3).
As it can be seen of the above analysis Hungary and Belarus even they had a common starting point, ended up in 2 completely different countries. One democratic state with great prospects as is Hungary and one that is still struggling for the rights of its people as is Belarus. But, which were the problems that they faced in the transition period and shaped their route? The second part of this essay will try to spread light in those important elements that drove their transition to the today’s form.
Hungary and Belarus faced various problems and difficulties in their transition period. Though, not many common characteristics exist basically because Hungary’s transition was fast in contrast with Belarus democracy that still to emerge. “In the 1990’s one of the most interesting features of Hungarian political developments was the frequent swing in the political opinion of the population” (László, 2000, p.35). Furthermore, one of the main problems that Hungary had to face in its transition effort was the “fragmentation of the political parties and their loss of orientation” (Cox, 1995, p.6). Lomax cited by Cox (1995, p.6) wrote that there was a lack of political culture as part of the “remains of the Berlin Wall in Hungary” and that the future of this country “dependent on the development of pluralist forms of behavior”.
On the other hand, Belarus seemed that it would follow a more western route. Very early the Party’s power was “shaken by popular demands form more freedom and National autonomy” (Gonenc, 2002, p.190). At the end of 1980’s “two important independent groups came into existence: Belarusian Language Association and Belarusian Ecological Union” while in 1988 the Belarusian Popular front was established (Gonenc, 2002, p.190). These early developments made the Belarusian future to seem prosperous. Though, various factors like the 1996 amendment of the Constitution by “a heavily manipulated referendum” didn’t allowed Belarus to transit in a democratic state (“Annual report”, April 16th, 2006). The referendum of 1996 “increased the power of the executive at the expense of the Parliament and judiciary”; as a result “the Parliament was disbanded and replaced by a bicameral Assembly field with presidential appointees” (“Annual report”, April 16th, 2006). As Kuzio (2002, p.4) wrote, Belarus was missing “the sociocultural pluralism, the civil society and independent economic actors when it became an independent state”. Moreover he added that some of the problems that Belarus had to face since the beginning of its independence were: “introducing political and economic reform, building institutions and forge a unified state” (Kuzio, 2002, p.4).
On the other hand, the “transition in Hungary was driven initially from the ruling elite who shared a common concern in avoiding open crisis and complete breakdown of order” (Diamond & Plattner, 2002, p.157); it was then that Pozsgay found support from several reformists and became strong enough to change the political scheme. However, Cox in 1995 (p.6) wrote that Hungary faced “a lack of commitment to pluralistic values, which was a legacy of the communist regime”; as he wrote, this could create implications in the country’s future democracy. Nevertheless as it has been proved this was not enough to stop the Hungarian democratic path.
The aim of this essay was to compare and contrast the extent of and problems involved in the democratisation of Hungary and Belarus. This essay supported that the two countries do not have any common characteristic today as they also didn’t have during their transition period. Gill (2000, p.195) characteristically wrote that “where the transition was in the hands of non-regime civil society forces, democracy has generally been the outcome; in contrast “where old regime forces remained firmly in control and were able to exclude civil society forces, non democracy has been the outcome” (Gill, 2000, p.195).
The Hungarians pushed forward the country’s transition while politicians were negotiating. The result is that today Hungary is one of the 25 EU Member-States. Its democratisation has been successfully completed and succeeded in fulfilling the necessary criteria for EU entrance. On the other hand, Belarus have failed to follow a democratic route and remained attached to Russia. The democratic forces of the country, especially after the 2006 elections, expect from the European Union and United States of America to play an active role in their struggle for freedom. It is true that Europe could take advantage of the Belarusian dependence in oil and natural gas; “such sanctions would hurt the regime and the nomenklatura more than ordinary citizens” (Kucharczyk, 2000, p.4) and might change their behavior. Though this will happen when the people of Belarus massively demand EU’s interference; the voices of Belarusian’s should become stronger and louder and then the western world might take action. When Fukuyama (cited by László, 2000, p.36) was writing about the Fall of the Soviet Union and the domination of “market economy even under socialist regime” most “observers were surprised”. Nowadays 15 years after the Fall of Communism, eight post-communist countries are members of the European Union and those that aren’t, are seeking for European help. Although no external help can provide the necessary power that a country needs to change. An internal force must maturate and lead the way of change; then the external help will come. Moreover, if a country’s democracy is established under external enforcement, it will not succeed and it will eventually collapse.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
A Country Study: Belarus. Retrieved April 18th, 2006, from The Library of the Congress database.
Annual Report on Human Rights. (1999). Retrieved April 16th, 2006 from www.fco.gov.uk.
Balcerowicz, L. (2002). Post-Communist Transition: Some Lessons. London: The institute of Economic Affairs.
Barny, G (2006). Hungary. In encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved April 16th, 2006.
Belarus. Retrieved April 20, 2006, from www.freedomhouse.com.
Belarus. (2006). Retrieved April 15th, 2006, from www.indexmundi.com/belarus/.
CIPE celebrates 10 years in Hungary. (2006) Retrieved April 18th, 2006 from CIPE database.
Cox, T. (Editor). (1995). Hungary: The Politics of Transition. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
Day, A. (2002). Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
Diamond, L. & Plattner, M.F. (2002). Democracy after Communism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, L. (2000). A Report Card on Democracy. Retrieved April 15th, 2006 from eee.hooverdigest.org/003/diamond.html.
Ekiert, G. (1996). State Against Society: Political Crises and Their aftermath in East Central Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
EU vows to help end Belarus democratic “winter”. Retrieved April 20th, 2006, from www.eubusiness.com
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[1] Hungary 1989 and Belarus 1991
[2] the 2nd of April 1996
[3] Lukashenka is the Belarusian president since 1994