Compare and contrast the extent of and problems involved in democratization of Hungary and Belarus.

“In 1900 there was not a single country in the

world that would qualify as a democracy by today’s standards.

As of January 2000, there were 120 democracies,

the highest number in the history of the world”.
Larry Diamond (“A report Card”, April 15th, 2006).

Nowadays looking at the geographic area that the USSR used to cover someone can see 15 different countries. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (former USSR countries) together with Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, FYROM, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, share a “common starting point” (Gill, 2002, p.9). Their common starting point is the fall of communism. At the present day, eight of them are members of the European Union while nine of them are still defined as “non democracies” (Gill, 2002, p.10). All these countries were framed under the soviet model and “shared a number of political characteristics” (Gill, 2002, p.11) such as: “a highly penetrative system and a totalistic conception of politics”. These characteristics among other needed to be reformed in the transition period.
Many scholars, commentators and politicians were highly concerned with the transition process of the former communist countries as long as the process was related with important issues like democracy, human rights, political rights, civil liberties and other. This essay will focus its analysis in two entirely different countries: Hungary, member of the European Union since 2004 and Belarus, a non-democratic country that still face great difficulties in its democratisation process. Fish (2002) cited by Gill (2002, p.12) grounded his analysis on the post-communist countries in “three explanatory variables”, the same variables that will be used in this essay:
Ÿ “the extent of the country’s economic reform: the greater the economic reform, the greater the democratization
Ÿ the extent to which the constitution concentrates power: the greater the concentration, the less the democracy, and,
Ÿ the development of autonomous societal organisation” (Gill, 2002, p.12).
At the first part of this essay an effort will be made to define the democratic context of Hungary and Belarus. Furthermore, the second part of this essay will identify the key problems of the transition period, while the conclusion will try to signify key issues that played an important role in the transition process of Hungary and Belarus.

“Transition is usually meant to refer to a change in a country’s institutional system, that is, a set of domestic institution and the related mechanisms of individuals interactions such as the elections” (Balcerowicz, 2002, p.17). As Balcerowicz wrote “political transition refers to the changes in the role and structure of the state and its democratisation” (2002, p.18). Despite the fact that Hungary and Belarus gained their independence from the Soviet Union in the early ninety’s[1], the process of “normalisation took a different route in each case” (Diamond & Plattner, 2002, p.159).
Hungary is a “small landlocked country in the heart of Europe, in the Carpathian basin” (“Hungary”, April 15th, 2006 from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu). Its population is around ten million people and the official language is the Hungarian (“Hungary”, April 15th, 2006 from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu.). On the other hand, Belarus is a country east of Poland and next to Lithuania which is the geographic centre of the European continent. Its population is also around ten million people and the spoken languages are Belarusian, Russian and other (“Belarus”, April 15th, 2006 from www.indexmundi.com/belarus/.). Belarus remained politically and economically closer to Russia than any other former Soviet Republic and this choice seems to have affected its transition process (“Belarus”, 15th of April 2006 from www.indexmundi.com/belarus).
Hungary’s transition to a Parliamentary Democracy was “the first and smoothest among the former Soviet Bloc” (“History of Hungary”, April 16th, 2006). In the late 1987, when Imre Pozsgay “lent his support to the formation of an independent group” - the Hungarian Democratic Forum - major changes start occurring (Diamond and Plattner, 2002, p.157). The Hungarian Constitution that was established in 1989 (approved by the Party and the National Assembly) was based on the 1949 Constitution enriched with “a series of amendments” (Barny, 2006, pp.69-72). In the modified Constitution the post of the President was established in place of the Presidential Council and the word “People’s” was eliminated from the name of the country (Barny, 2006, pp.69-72). In Hungary “transition to democracy was the outcome of negotiations and compromises between the regime and the opposition forces” and this had a direct impact on the rapid and effective political and economic changes. Moreover as Gonenc (2002, p.134) wrote there was always “strong resistance to the domination of Moscow in Hungary”. Hungary on the 31st of March of 1994 applied for EU membership and targeted its orientation in a European path.
On the contrary, “from the earliest days of its independence” Belarus ruling elite cultivated the “idea of returning to the Russian fold” (Day, 2002, p.5). Five years after its independence Belarus[2] proceeded in a Union Agreement with “mother Russia”; according to the Agreement, “the two countries would retain their national independence after entering into a Confederal Union with each other, but would share government policies in all fields” (Day, 2002, p.5). Despite of the close relation of the two countries this agreement has not yet been put into action.
Belarus has not yet succeeded in becoming a democratic state. Sequentially events that started in 1996 stopped the country’s democratic transition. A referendum that was held in 1996 “strengthened Lukashenka’s[3] presidential authority” (Day, 2002, p.52). The Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe expressed their doubts about the results, but the harm has already been done. The same scheme repeated in the presidential elections of 2001 where Lukashenka won with the 75.6% of the vote. The “opposition parties continued to protest about the lack of legitimate mandate” but in vain (Day, 2002, p.52). The final act was played on the 19th of March 2006 when Lukashenka for the third time succeeded in staying in power and the democratic dream faded (“EU vows”, April 20th, 2006). The dictatorial regime that Lukashenka created the last decade “combines methods of soft and hard power” that have many similarities with the “martial law imposed in late 1981 in Poland” (Kucharczyk,2000, p.1).
Moreover, the extent that political rights, human rights and civil liberties among other are secured in a society proves its democratic nature. It was stated by the Freedom House during the election of 2006 that “in an effort to halt communication between Belarusian citizens and the international community, the government has arrested journalists and suspended the printing of independent newspapers” (“Freedom House calls”, April 20th, 2006). “Belarus was ranked 74 out of 146 countries surveyed in the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index” (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). In addition, the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal procedure was revised in December 2005 and “made civil society and political activism even more risky” (Suri Sanjay, April 20th, 2006); even Belarusian Courts are heavily influenced by the government (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). The political rights declined in 2006 from 6 to 7 (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhaouse.com) while “several people were arrested and imprisoned several days before the elections” (Suri Sanjay, April 20th, 2006). Even the internet access is limited in Belarus and an internal passport system “is required for domestic travel that controls freedom of movement and choice of residence” (“Belarus”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). The Annual Report on Human Rights refers that in Belarus:
“there is a state monopoly on the broadcast media, and the political opposition is generally denied air time on TV and radio”, moreover, “contact between state officials and the independent media is restricted” (“Annual Report”, April 20th, 2006).
On the opposite side, Hungary has transformed in a free and democratic country as soon as it gained its independence; even the early elections of the 1990 were characterised as free and fair (Gill, 2002, p.7). The period between October 1989 and the elections of March 1990 were characterized by: “i) the involvement of the broader public who were able to take part in discussions, ii) a referendum, and iii) eventually the elected non-communist government of Antall” (Cox, 1995, p.6). As Cox (1995, p.6) wrote, the public played important role in Hungary’s evolution, especially at the “stage that led to the breakdown of the political cooperation between the moderates and the reformers and helped in shaping the development of the parties”. Nowadays, Hungary’s civil liberties are rated with 1 “due to the deepening of European Union integration trends, resulting in greater conformity with EU human rights standards” (“Hungary”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com). According to the Freedom House, the Courts are generally fair, while NGO’s are active without restrictions. Though one of the major problems that Hungary faces is the discrimination against Roma population that still continuous; in a governments effort to face this problem, “new commissioners have been appointed to promote equal opportunities” (“Hungary”, April 20th, 2005 from www.freedomhouse.com)
Last but not least, economic reform played an important role in the transition period: “the greater the economic reform, the greater the democratisation” (Fish, 2002, cited by Gill, 2002, p.12). Hungary and Czech Republic succeeded to be on the top of the rank in economic reform among the former communist countries, while Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan are fourth form the bottom (Gill, 2000, p.195). The economic reform of the former communist countries concentrated on “the financial sector, the informal sector, the real estate market, privatization, tax policies and in local governments role in private sector development” (“CIPE celebrates”, April 18th, 2006).
Hungary succeeded in ten years time to reduce the public deficit, to reduce unemployment and accelerate the country’s economic growth (Commission official, April 18th, 2006). According to the European Commission in November 2001 the privatization process was almost completed and the process of economic transition reached its higher level (Commission Official, April 18th, 2006). The 2005 the Hungarian GDP was 16.100 while the real growth was 3.9% (“Hungary - CIA fact book”, April 20th, 2006). On the other hand, Belarusian economic reform was characterized by hyperinflation, falling GDP and general economic chaos (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.1). As Vorobeychik (2002, p.1) wrote, the “long awaited independence was mostly symbolic as it hardly witnessed any change, be it political or institutional”. As he pointed, the old regime was still governing the country even when democracy supposed to have arisen. The “reluctance of the government to enact radical reforms was a serious problem as both countries suffered greatly from the remnants of old institutions and relations” (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.2). However, the first years of Belarusian independence didn’t indicate its future course; Belarus benefited in the beginning from its good relations and homogeneity with Russia (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.2). It seemed that Belarus would have better future than many other former communist countries but failed to do so. In contrast to Hungary, Belarus is still facing an inflation of 200% while the GDP per capita is 7.700, less than the half of the Hungarian (Vorobeychik, 2002, p.3).


As it can be seen of the above analysis Hungary and Belarus even they had a common starting point, ended up in 2 completely different countries. One democratic state with great prospects as is Hungary and one that is still struggling for the rights of its people as is Belarus. But, which were the problems that they faced in the transition period and shaped their route? The second part of this essay will try to spread light in those important elements that drove their transition to the today’s form.
Hungary and Belarus faced various problems and difficulties in their transition period. Though, not many common characteristics exist basically because Hungary’s transition was fast in contrast with Belarus democracy that still to emerge. “In the 1990’s one of the most interesting features of Hungarian political developments was the frequent swing in the political opinion of the population” (László, 2000, p.35). Furthermore, one of the main problems that Hungary had to face in its transition effort was the “fragmentation of the political parties and their loss of orientation” (Cox, 1995, p.6). Lomax cited by Cox (1995, p.6) wrote that there was a lack of political culture as part of the “remains of the Berlin Wall in Hungary” and that the future of this country “dependent on the development of pluralist forms of behavior”.
On the other hand, Belarus seemed that it would follow a more western route. Very early the Party’s power was “shaken by popular demands form more freedom and National autonomy” (Gonenc, 2002, p.190). At the end of 1980’s “two important independent groups came into existence: Belarusian Language Association and Belarusian Ecological Union” while in 1988 the Belarusian Popular front was established (Gonenc, 2002, p.190). These early developments made the Belarusian future to seem prosperous. Though, various factors like the 1996 amendment of the Constitution by “a heavily manipulated referendum” didn’t allowed Belarus to transit in a democratic state (“Annual report”, April 16th, 2006). The referendum of 1996 “increased the power of the executive at the expense of the Parliament and judiciary”; as a result “the Parliament was disbanded and replaced by a bicameral Assembly field with presidential appointees” (“Annual report”, April 16th, 2006). As Kuzio (2002, p.4) wrote, Belarus was missing “the sociocultural pluralism, the civil society and independent economic actors when it became an independent state”. Moreover he added that some of the problems that Belarus had to face since the beginning of its independence were: “introducing political and economic reform, building institutions and forge a unified state” (Kuzio, 2002, p.4).
On the other hand, the “transition in Hungary was driven initially from the ruling elite who shared a common concern in avoiding open crisis and complete breakdown of order” (Diamond & Plattner, 2002, p.157); it was then that Pozsgay found support from several reformists and became strong enough to change the political scheme. However, Cox in 1995 (p.6) wrote that Hungary faced “a lack of commitment to pluralistic values, which was a legacy of the communist regime”; as he wrote, this could create implications in the country’s future democracy. Nevertheless as it has been proved this was not enough to stop the Hungarian democratic path.

The aim of this essay was to compare and contrast the extent of and problems involved in the democratisation of Hungary and Belarus. This essay supported that the two countries do not have any common characteristic today as they also didn’t have during their transition period. Gill (2000, p.195) characteristically wrote that “where the transition was in the hands of non-regime civil society forces, democracy has generally been the outcome; in contrast “where old regime forces remained firmly in control and were able to exclude civil society forces, non democracy has been the outcome” (Gill, 2000, p.195).
The Hungarians pushed forward the country’s transition while politicians were negotiating. The result is that today Hungary is one of the 25 EU Member-States. Its democratisation has been successfully completed and succeeded in fulfilling the necessary criteria for EU entrance. On the other hand, Belarus have failed to follow a democratic route and remained attached to Russia. The democratic forces of the country, especially after the 2006 elections, expect from the European Union and United States of America to play an active role in their struggle for freedom. It is true that Europe could take advantage of the Belarusian dependence in oil and natural gas; “such sanctions would hurt the regime and the nomenklatura more than ordinary citizens” (Kucharczyk, 2000, p.4) and might change their behavior. Though this will happen when the people of Belarus massively demand EU’s interference; the voices of Belarusian’s should become stronger and louder and then the western world might take action. When Fukuyama (cited by László, 2000, p.36) was writing about the Fall of the Soviet Union and the domination of “market economy even under socialist regime” most “observers were surprised”. Nowadays 15 years after the Fall of Communism, eight post-communist countries are members of the European Union and those that aren’t, are seeking for European help. Although no external help can provide the necessary power that a country needs to change. An internal force must maturate and lead the way of change; then the external help will come. Moreover, if a country’s democracy is established under external enforcement, it will not succeed and it will eventually collapse.


BIBLIOGRAPHY:

A Country Study: Belarus. Retrieved April 18th, 2006, from The Library of the Congress database.
Annual Report on Human Rights. (1999). Retrieved April 16th, 2006 from www.fco.gov.uk.
Balcerowicz, L. (2002). Post-Communist Transition: Some Lessons. London: The institute of Economic Affairs.
Barny, G (2006). Hungary. In encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved April 16th, 2006.
Belarus. Retrieved April 20, 2006, from www.freedomhouse.com.
Belarus. (2006). Retrieved April 15th, 2006, from www.indexmundi.com/belarus/.
CIPE celebrates 10 years in Hungary. (2006) Retrieved April 18th, 2006 from CIPE database.
Cox, T. (Editor). (1995). Hungary: The Politics of Transition. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
Day, A. (2002). Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
Diamond, L. & Plattner, M.F. (2002). Democracy after Communism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, L. (2000). A Report Card on Democracy. Retrieved April 15th, 2006 from eee.hooverdigest.org/003/diamond.html.
Ekiert, G. (1996). State Against Society: Political Crises and Their aftermath in East Central Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
EU vows to help end Belarus democratic “winter”. Retrieved April 20th, 2006, from www.eubusiness.com
European Union (2004). Commission Papers. Retrieved April 18th, 2006 from EUROPA database.
Freedom House calls Belarus Election a Sham. Retrieved April 25th, 2006, from www.dataminsk.by/belarusnews/03006/394.html.
Freedom House Calls Belarus Election a Sham. Retrieved April 20th, 2006, from the www.freedomhouse.com.

Gill, G.J. (2000). Dynamics of Democratisation: Elites, Civil Society & the Transition Process. New York: Palgrave Publishers.
Gill, G.J. (2002). Democracy & Post-Communism: Political Change in the Post-Communism World. Florence: Palgrave Publishers.
Gonenc, L. (2002). Prospects for Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Countries. Leiden, NLD: Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drkkerij.
Hungary. (2006). Retrieved April 15th, 2006, from www.szote.u-szeyed.hu.
Hungary. Retrieved April 20th, 2006 from www.freedomhouse.com.
Hungary - CIA fact book. (2006). Retrieved April 20th, 2006 from www.cia.gov.
History of Hungary. Retrieved the April 16th, 2006 from www.globalvolunteers.com
Korosteleva, E., Marsh, R. & Lawson, C. (2003). Difficulties of Elite Formation in Belarus after 1991. London: Curzon Press.
Kucharczyk, J. Assisting democratic Transition in Belarus: lessons from pre-1989 Poland. Retrieved April 19th, 2006 from ISP database.
Kuzio, T. (2002). National Identity and Democratic Transition in post-Soviet Ukraine and Belarus: a theoretical and comparative perspective - Part I. Volume 4, Number 15. July 24, 2002.
László, A. (2000). Hungary on the road to the European Union - Transition in Blue. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
Pridham, G., Herring E., & Sanford, G. (1997). Building democracy? - The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe (2nd ed.). London: Leicester University Press.
Stark, D. (2000). Hungary in Transition. Retrieved April 16th, 2006, from the Columbia University database.
Suri, S. (2006). Democracy and civil Society Throttled. IPS News. Retrieved April 15th, 2006 from www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=32614.
Vorobeychik, Y. (2002). Comparative Analysis of the Economic transition of Belarus and Ukraine. Unpublished undergraduate dissertation, University of Northwestern, Evanston. Retrieved April 20th, 2006 from www.eecs.umich.edu/~yvorobey/writings.htm.
[1] Hungary 1989 and Belarus 1991
[2] the 2nd of April 1996
[3] Lukashenka is the Belarusian president since 1994

Contrast United Nations: Peacekeeping in the post Cold War οrder with its Cold War role.

Peacekeeping: the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

Agenda for Peace.

The United Nations was created on 24th of October 1945 by 51 countries, while in 2006 is consisted of 191 Member States (UN database), “nearly every state in the world” (Baylis &Smith, 2005, p.406). According to the Charter of the United Nations, which was signed at San Francisco on 26th of June 1945 the United Nations had four main purposes (Paragraph 1):
Ÿ to maintain international peace and security,
Ÿ to develop friendly relations among the Nations,
Ÿ to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting the respect for human rights,
Ÿ and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of Nations.
Though, it also came to be clear that one of the significant functions that the UN would be referred to act upon would be to “assist in the orderly development of independence and freedom from external control in areas where peoples had been subjected to some form of foreign rule and where nationalism had become a strong and vital force” (Goodrich & Simons, 1974, p.52). As former secretary Stettinius stated: “the Organization also has the purpose and its empowered to take positive and affirmative action in bringing about the conditions essential for peace throughout the world and for its enjoyment” (Goodrich & Simons, 1975, p.13). Peacekeeping has been characterized by Roberts and Kingsbury (1993, p.184) as “international help which is sometimes sent to an immediate problem area when disputing states wish, at least for the time being, to live in peace”.
The establishment of the United Nations though, was not the first time that different Nations around the world tried to cooperate; the League of Nations was the first effort and the first World War was the first cause. The League of Nations “intended to make future wars impossible, but a major problem was the League’s lack of effective power” (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.407). According to Goodrich and Simons if a Member turned to war then the League of Nations, “immediately subjected all trade or financial relations, the prohibitions of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any-other state, whether a Member of the League or no”(1975, p. 424). Although O’Neil and Rees (2005, p.192) characteristically wrote that “Hitler’s decision in March 1936 to reoccupy the Rhineland, a designated demilitarized zone according to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, effectively pulled the plug on the League’s life support system”. The League as soon as the Second World War started had already “failed to address a number of acts of aggression” (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.407). It seems that economic restrictions were not enough for the League of Nations to be effective and farther military measures should be taken when it was required.

The power of Veto:

The Article 27 of the UN Charter gave to the five Permanent Members of the United Nations the Power to Veto; according to the Charter, if a Permanent Member did not vote a resolution, then the resolution could not be adopted. As Baylis and Smith mentioned “with the ideological polarity of the Cold War, the UN procedures for collective security were still-born” (2005, p.193). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 was the first time that a joint security system was put into action. According to Goodrich and Simons it was the “ever-present threat of Soviet Veto in the Council” that “largely removed any possibility of effective United Nations action through that organ” (1975, p.51). Malone (2004) cited by Baylis and Smith (2005, p.411) notices that “from 1945 to 1990, 193 substantive Vetoes were invoked in the Security Council” and according to the UN list only 15 Vetoes from 1990 to 2003. It is obvious that the UN, during the Cold War, had to overcome the controversial interests of United States and Soviet Union since the “power to Veto could be used whenever the major interests of the great powers were threatened” (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.411).

Peacekeeping:

The year 2006 United Nations completed 58 years of peacekeeping operations. Though, since 1948 significant changes have occurred and the present peacekeeping operations do not remind any of the peacekeeping operations of the past. Cold War has a pivotal role in this change.

Cold War:

The United Nations during the Cold War undertook only seventeen peacekeeping operations, five of which still run (UN database). O’Neill and Rees (2005, p.24) wrote that during the Cold War the permanent members of United Nations did not play significant role in Peacekeeping. The countries that involved in these operations were: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sweden and Netherlands (UN database). As Twitchett (1971, p.73) notices, “UN’s strength lay in the middle-range powers who provided the contingents and not in the two super powers”; though “if a situation required military peace-keeping in one form or another were to arise in Africa, Asia or Americas, it is by no means clear that there would be either basic agreement between the super powers or willingness by the parties to accept their assertion of responsibility” (Twitchett, 1971, p.74). The peacekeeping operations during the Cold War consisted of units with various size and “only UNEF I and II, ONUC, UNFICYP and UNIFIL exceeded three thousand personnel” (O’Neill & Rees, 2005, p.24). In Congo (ONUC) the operation engaged some 15.000-20.000 personnel from 34 states and was the largest during this period.
Peacekeeping operations like “preventive diplomacy, required some cooperation or at least acquiescence from governments” (Baehr & Gordenker, 1999, p.92) of all the involved parts. In practice, “a peacekeeping operation requires the co-operation of the authorities of the state in whose territory it operates and consent is therefore a normal prerequisite”(Twitchett, 1971, p.77). Furthermore, former Secretary - General Hammarskjöld (Twitchett, 1971, p.78) was clear and categorical about the need of the UN to keep distance and not get involved in any internal struggle; although this was really difficult in operations like Congo. He had also decided that operations should not exercise any form of military strength; he “argued that the real strength of a peacekeeping operation lay not in its capacity to use force, but precisely in its not using force” (O’Neill & Rees, 2005, p.34).
The classical peacekeeping operation entails the placement of a UN force between the disputed parties after a ceasefire; the force can use its weapons only for self-defense and is established with the consent of the host state (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p. 412); though 1973 onwards, self-defense “was deemed to include situations in which peace-keepers were being prevented from fulfilling their mandate“(O’Neill & Rees, 2005, p.34). O’Neill and Rees characteristically wrote that “unlike conventional military operations, there were no template to apply and therefore no matching of resources to task” (O’Neill & Rees, 2005, p.25); there were times they didn’t’t have the freedom to move and much to say about their placement. This kind of operation was first used in November 1956 when a UN force was send to Egypt to help the exit of British and French forces from the Suez Canal zone , and then to settle between Egyptian and Israeli forces (Baehr & Gordenker, 1999, p. 72). The same kind of mission was used in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 and in the Golan Heights (UNDOF) in 1974 (UN database).
The technique of peacekeeping during the Cold War was linked to the divided UN Security Council; as Twitchett (1971, p.30) pointed, the role of the units during the operations rather than “keeping” the peace was limited to observing it. A general officer of the United Nations characteristically said that “peacekeeping is to war-making what acting is to ballet - the environment is similar but the techniques are very different” (Fabian, 1971, p.28). The peacekeeping operation during the Cold War rather than being well organized and well resourced operations were little more than roughly organized reactions to several crises, that “often seemed to lack clear objectives, leadership and guidance (O‘Neill and Rees, 2005, p.24). According to the basic principle of the UN operations of non-intervention and the self-defense, the obvious inference is that the UN had not real power to disarm contrary to the its power after the Cold-War; the lack of power to disarm as Twitchett (1971, p.820) mentioned proved to be “disastrous to the achievement of the mandate of the Force. Even though O’Neill and Rees (2005, p.32) noticed that “the compromise activity introduced by the UN was preferable to total inaction”. It was really confusing that on the one hand UN employed military forces and sends them “into the fire” and on the other did not give them the appropriate means to serve their mandate. Though, it was reasonably unthinkable that the UN soldiers would open fire during interventions, like in Egypt and Cyprus, against the Egyptians or the Cypriots (Twitchett, 1971, p.29).
The UN peacekeeping operations did not start demanding attention until the mid-1950’s; it was then that the United Nations realized that the creation of an efficient system of preparedness for the operations would be truly effective (Fabian,1971, p.15). Roberts and Kingsbury (1993, p.193) wrote that “in the period up to 1966 more peacekeeping bodies were set up in Asia than anywhere else” while decolonization was taking place. On the other hand they (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p.28) mentioned that the most effective interferences were those that were dealing with short term operations like UNOGIL, UNEF I and DOMEREP in contrast with UNTSO, UNMOGIP and UNFICYP that dealing with local disputes and ONUC which get over UN’s powers. The major reason for this is that a peacekeeping operation can be really effective when the parties involved want external help, otherwise it is not likely to success.
An operation that needs to be separated form the general “peacekeeping” effort of the United Nations during the Cold War is the intervention in Korea in 1950. The operation that lasted until 1953 was “peace enforcement not peacekeeping” (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p.193). On this kind of operations, like in Gulf War in the post-Cold War period, the “Security Council agreed to a mandate for an agent to act on its behalf” (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.412). Furthermore, Diehl (1996) cited by O’Neill and Rees (2005, p.35) defined peace-enforcement as “a large scale military operation designed to defend the victims of international aggression and restore peace and security by the threat of the aggressor’s forces”, and this is the reason that distinguish from peace-keeping. As Fergus and Callan wrote (2002, p.36), “enforcement meant an end to strict impartiality and the United Nations became a key player in the conflict”.
The United Nations action during the Cold War was overshadowed by the conflict between the two super powers and as O’Neill and Rees (2005, p.25) characteristically wrote the “UN peacekeeping became something of a curiosity of interest only to those directly involved and a number of academics”. Although, the period between 1956 and 1974 was described from under Secretary Marrack Goulding as the “Golden age” of United Nations for UN peacekeeping operations (O‘Neil & Rees, 2005, p.25); however Roberts (1994) cited by O’Neill and Rees (2005, p.30) will argue that the first four decades of United Nations might be impressive but “it would be wrong” to characterize it as “a golden age”. Yet even more Twitchett (1971, p. 81) will characterize the peacekeeping operations “unsatisfactory and inexistent” and that new initiatives should be taken. The financial problems remained serious at the end of 1970’s and the implacability of the Soviet Union and China for certain issues hold back the progress of the UN for certain years.
Furthermore, the image of the United Nations during the Cold War did not forebode the transformation that was going to take place as soon as the Cold War would end. After 1991 as it will be seen in the next chapter United Nations will multiply its actions and presence in all conflict areas.

Post-Cold War period:

In contrast to the earlier period, in the post-Cold War era the United Nations authorized 42 operations of which 33 have been completed (O‘Neill & Rees, 2005, p.30); 13 of them are consisted of civilian police and not army forces, while five Cold War operations still exist (UN database). Furthermore, apart of the auxesis of the number of operations, the geographic focus “shifted from Middle East to Africa and Europe, as well as to a lesser extent Central America and Asia (O‘Neill & Rees, 2005, pp. 30-31). The United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Post-Cold War period focused in “resisting aggression between states, in attempting resolution in disputed between states (civil wars) and by focusing on conditions within states, including economic, social and political conditions” (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.414) like democratization. The major change in this period is that the UN has to deal with intrastate conflict and this would make intervention more difficult. Sellers (1996, p.237) characteristically wrote that “the two superpowers determined to bring an end to some embarrassing and costly confrontations” as soon as the Cold War ended; some of the internal conflicts were UN tried to help took place in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Afghanistan (UN database). After 1991 United Nations left back the “traditional form of peacekeeping” and “new” Post-Cold War operations came about (O‘Neill & Rees, 2005, p. 34). Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali characterized those operations “peacekeeping in the midst of war” and he added that this occurred in “an emotional environment in which effective decision-making could be far more difficult” (Sellers, 1996, p.258). There were three types of internal conflicts that forced the Security council to act: “i) cruel and destructive civil wars that were left over from the period of the Cold War, ii) internal conflicts with extensive humanitarian problems and violations of basic human rights, and iii) conflicts that threatened the stability and security of surrounding regions” (Sellers, 1996, p.240).
The post-Cold War period and the intervention in intrastate conflicts brought one significant change in the operations; no official government could ask the United Nations help because several times non governmental groups controlled the conflict areas. Most of the times, “genuine and reliable consent by the parties could not be expected” (Sellers, 1996, p.253). In most of these operations “humanitarian considerations” played vital role in the initiative for action; as Sellers (1996, p.241) noticed, “humanitarian assistance was supposed to be the paramount and possibly the sole function” of complex operations like Bosnia - Herzegovina and Somalia. The Security Council the 5th of April 1991 under the Resolution 688, made it clear that “gross violations of human rights threatened the international security” (Sellers, 1996, p. 241).
In Kosovo the NATO intervention aimed to demonstrate that they were acting according to the UN Charter and the Resolutions of the Security Council (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.422). Humanitarian assistance and protection of populations was the main objective of the operation; though the threat to regional stability was equally important because a War was in progress in the heart of Europe. UNPROFOR aimed to protect the relief convoys over the road, though according to Baehr and Gordenk (1999, p.85) they disposed neither the authority nor the means to halt armed engagements. United Nations and Western democracies tried to “use techniques that were successful during the Cold War; they tried to negotiate and put an end to the conflict” (Payne, February 2001). When negotiations failed and atrocious human rights abuses occurred the UN and the Western democracies forced to take action, “they slowly and tortuously stumbled their way to a peace process backed by the utilization of force to stop the fighting” (Payne, February 2001). Furthermore, in 1993 the “ethnic cleansing” that was taking place in the former Yugoslavia forced the Security Council to pass further Resolutions in an effort to end the conflicts in Bosnia (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, pp. 225-228); an “embargo” occurred against the disputed parts. Thought 167 fatalities of the UNPROFOR (UN database) during the internal conflicts in former Yugoslavia shows that safe areas and cease fire was not enough to ensure safety not even for UN soldiers.
Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era was not the only action that UN undertook. The Gulf War started with the “invasion and annexation” of Kuwait by Iraq and an enforcement operation took place (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p.184). This operation brought all five permanent members of the Security Council, for the first time in UN operations, in agreement to provide military observers in the Mission (UNIKOM) (UN database); the initiative for this operation though belongs to the United States. United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, for the first time since the Korean War, authorized the use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait. The necessity for the UN Security Council to “authorize the US to lead the coalition forces demonstrated the structural weaknesses in the UN system”(Payne, February 2001). The UN is unable to “field a large, well-trained, and equipped force to act on its behalf unless the strategic interests of the US or other wealthy western nations are directly involved” (Payne, February 2001). Additionally, the US as well as other nations will not accept to place its troops under UN command and control. The common result is that “two chains of command exist, sometimes resulting in conflicting guidance to the troops in the field” (Payne, February 2001). To become effective in the field of an operation United Nations must determine its power to make use of quality forces from Member States.
One of the major issues that concerned the United Nations was, and still is, the cost of the operations. The cost of peacekeeping operations “caused serious problems” and this is the reason that “observer mission have been less controversial” (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p.197), because they cost less. Baehr and Gordenker (1999, p.91) added that “in some years, peacekeeping operations cost more than the rest of the whole UN budget”; for example, by the mid-1990’s almost 80.000 UN military personnel were in action all over the world. The United States in 1993 “sought to decrease share of peacekeeping costs from 30 per cent to 25 per cent creating new financial pressures on the world organization” (Fergus & Callan, 2002 p.95). This behavior of the United States among others “has left the United Nations in a vulnerable position” (Fergus & Callan, 2002. p 95). Although Urquhart (1992) cited by Roberts and Kingsbury (1993, p.238) pointed out that “the cost of two days of Desert storm, at about a billion dollars a day, would have easily covered all the UN’s expenses, including peacekeeping and emergency operations for a whole year”.
A common solution for the peacekeeping operations was that the disputed parts have to pay some of the expenses; in Kuwait for example “the two thirds of the expenses were borne by Kuwait and only the rest were paid by assessed contributions of Member States” (UN database). Nevertheless former General Secretary Boutros Ghalli (1995) cited by Fergus and Callan (2002, p.95) very successfully noticed that “the failure of Member States to pay their assessed contributions calls into question the credibility of those who have willed the ends but not the means — and who then criticize the United Nations for its failures”.

Conclusion:

United Nations have played a significant role since its inception in 1945; however its post-Cold War action is considerably different from that in the Cold War era. Some of the main differences that weren’t mentioned in the text can be highlighted:
Ÿ UN in the post-Cold War era organized “wider peacekeeping” operations or as O’Neill and Rees (2005, p.35) characterize it “multidimensional peacekeeping”
Ÿ in the post-Cold War period there is a geographical spread of operations and an increased range of states contributed in personnel (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p.235)
Ÿ there is “an increased hybridization of peacekeeping in terms of the elements -including humanitarian and human rights components in some case” (Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993, p.235)
Ÿ media play a vital role in the operations and they influence the United Nations to take action in an increasing number of cases (O’Neill and Rees, 2005, p.33-35)
Ÿ in the post-Cold War era the forces “negotiate , assist, persuade and try to draw conflicting parties into a political process that can be assisted, but not coerced, by a peacekeeping and humanitarian presence” (Sellers, 1996,p.264)
Ÿ and, in the post-cold War era attention “shifted from preventing violence to peacekeeping , including supporting civil society, institutional development and democracy as in the cases of East Timor and Bosnia - Herzegovina” (O’Neill and Rees, 2005, p.30).
However United Nations have several times been marginalized by the superpowers; during the Cold War it was the Soviet Union that “foster instability which might lead to regional change” (O’Neill and Rees, 2005, p.40) with the extensive use of veto. On the other hand, in the post-Cold War era it is the United States that demonstrate “a strong interest in an early resolutions of several crisis” (Sellers, 1996, p.264) like Haiti; this behavior though declined the positive impact towards people. The same behavior USA presented in missions in the Middle East which resulted sometimes in mass protests against the operations and the loss of faith of peoples in the peacekeeping effort.
Furthermore as for the theoretical approach, while the Cold War ended the fight between the Realists and the Liberalists assumed to come to an end. Fukuyama (1989) cited by Baylis and Smith (2005, p.190) wrote an article with which celebrated the “triumph of Liberalism”; the Cold War ended and there was no sign of war. Though, the morning of 9/11 changed the route of history and theory. As a result United States decided to “punish” those who believed to be the enemy and so the Realists came to be right. A new cycle of violence have started. Keohane (1989) wrote that “Realism offered something like a manual for maximizing the interest of the state in a hostile environment” (Baylis & Smith, 2005, p.162). It was the Realists who outlined that outside of the boundaries of the state anarchy exist; the 9/11 proved them right once again. As Baylis and Smith (2005, p.179) characteristically wrote “there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty first century will be a realist theory: Europe continues to be as divided by different national interests as it is united by a common good”. Concluding, history is repeating itself; from the mythical war of Troy until the “war against terrorism”, there is always a reason that drive people to war, though most of the times this reason ends to be wrong.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baehr, P.R. and Gordenk, L. (1999). The United Nations at the end of the 1990s (3rd ed.). London: Macmillan.
Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (2005). The Globalization of World Politics - An introduction to international relations (2nd ed.). Hants: Ashford Colour Ltd.
BBC (2002, December 5). Gorazde: The Peacekeepers Tale. Retrieved February 5, 2006, from BBC Online Network.
BBC (2006, January 18). New Peacekeeping Head for Haiti . Retrieved February 5, 2006, from BBC Online Network.
Boyd, J. (1972). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal. London: Anvil Books.
Browne, M. A. (2003, May 7). United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress. Retrieved February 5, 2006, from the AU database.
Burley, J. & Tregear, P. (1970). African Development and Europe. Bletchley: The European Printing Company.
Carr, F. & Callan, T. (2002). Managing Conflict in the new Europe - The Role of International Institutions. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Daniel, D. C. F. & Bradd C. H. (1995). Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Durch, W.J. (1993). The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fabian, L.L. (1971). Soldiers without Enemies - Preparing the United Nations for peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions.
Frangsmyr, T. (1989). The Nobel prizes 1988. Retrieved February 5, 2006, from www.nobelprize.org.
Gerstle, G. (2001). American Crucible. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Global Policy Forum (2006). Peacekeeping. Retrieved February 5, 2006, from http://www.globalpolicy.org.
Global Policy Forum (2006). The Security Council Veto. Retrieved February 5, 2006, from http://www.globalpolicy.org.
Goodrich, L.M. & Simons, A.P. (1974). The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (2nd ed.). Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Gosgrove, C. A. (1970). The New International Actors - The United Nations and the European Economic Community. Bristol: Western Printing services Ltd.
Keohane, R. (1989). Theory of World Politics: Structural realism and Beyond. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Keylor, W. (1992). The Twentieth Century World: An International History. New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, J.T. & Rees, N. (2005). United Nations Peacekeeping on the Post-Cold War Era. London and New York: Routledge.
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Payne, C. (2006). Peacekeeping. Retrieved February 5, 2006, from www.globalterrorism101.com.
Roberts, A. & Kingsbury, B. (1993). United Nations, Divided World (2nd ed).Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sarooshi, D. (1999). The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Sellers, M. (1996). The New World Order. Oxford: BERG.
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THE COMMISSION PROPOSES, THE PARLIAMENT ADVISES, AND THE COUNCIL DECIDES. DO YOU AGREE?

“The focus in the future will be on the construction of a legitimate Constitutional order for Policy-making responsive to the desires of National governments and their citizens”.

(Moravscik and Nikolaidis, 1998)



Sequential treaties and treaty reforms - the Treaty of Paris in 1952(European Coal and Steel Community), the Treaty of 1957 (where the European Economic Community was established), the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty (which “gave birth” to the European Union), the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), the Nice Treaty in 2003 and the “Constitutional Treaty” which is not yet ratified - have given to the European Institutions the today’s form and power.
The European Union since the Treaty of Rome has more or less the same structure. The modern discipline (Simon Hix, 1999,p.12) dates from the end of the nineteenth century, when people such as Woodrow, Robert Michels, Knut Wicksell, Lord Bryce and Max Weber first developed tools and categories to analyze political institutions, including bureaucracies, governments, parliaments and political parties. The changes that have occurred aimed to the
improvement of the effectiveness of the Institutions. The Commission, the Parliament and the Council together with the European Court of Justice -established in the 1950s - hold the most significant power in the EU; the power of decision making. From the formation of this structure there were often spectacular battles between the Institutions; these resulted in co-changes to the legislature procedure and in today’s formation. As Simon Hix(1999)said “actors act upon their preferences in a rational way by pursuing strategy that is more likely to produce the outcome they want”(p.12).

Institutions for Europe

The classic description of the distribution of power between EU Institutions - the Commission proposes, the Parliament advises and the Council decides - does not apply in the modern form of the Union, simply because through the Treaties and Treaty reforms the legislature procedure became more complicated and more credential, though not perfect yet.
The legislative powers and impact of the EP “have grown dramatically since its inception and especially over the last twenty years” (Amie Kreppel,2002,p.4). The establishment of elections by the people as well as the substantial treaty revisions all included provisions to validate the legislature role of the EP.
The Commission, on the other hand, was always the most misunderstood institution and the main recipient of criticism. John McCormick(1996) argued that for some analysts, Brussels has become a codeword for some vague and threatening notion of government by bureaucracy, or “creeping federalism”(p.104). Nowadays nevertheless, the Commission has not as much power as in the past, and is being successively reduced while those of the others institutions increase.
Last but not least the Council becomes co-legislator in an increasing number of policy areas and obtains a growing political impact. Desmond Dinan (1999) argues that even though it is especially important for the Council to work closely with the EP, their relationship is far touchier than the Council-Commission relationship (p.241). The European Parliament always confronted the Council as the lighthouse of intergovernmentalism.
As the EC/EU has grown in size, as more complicated polity areas came into the agenda; different economical conditions, different national and ideological interests, different socio-political targets, and many more factors created a new Europe in which the Institutions have to obtain prosperity.

Contemporary Institutions

When the EP was established, and certainly for most of its half century story, its Members had no big chance to influence policy-making. It was the only institution that represented “the citizens of Europe” but could not do much to directly induce the EU policy process.
Successively treaties changed the balance in the decision-making process of the European Union. The Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1999) Treaties generated the legislative face of the Union. The Commission would no longer be the only Institution that could propose legislation, as much as the Council would no longer be the only Institution that could decide. Sequentially, one treaty to another the Institutions would be obliged to interact and work together to produce legislation. Amie Kreppel (2002) had characteristically said that the EP has evolved from an ideologically dogmatic, loosely organized chamber of debate to a frequently bipartisan and hierchically structured legislative body (p.8).
The EU Institutions generate five types of policies: macroeconomic, citizen, regulatory, expenditure and foreign. There are two main
processes for them to be established:

Ÿ through supranational processes, where the initiative belongs to the Commission and,
Ÿ through intergovernmental processes, where the Council is the leading executive and legislative body.

Comitology:

The Commission is not as free as most people think in shaping policy measures when implementing EU legislation. Due to Simon Hix (2005) in 1987 July a Council’s decision established the “comitology system” {(it was reformed on June 1999)-(1987/373/EEC), (1999/468/EC)}. Comitology means “the Council designed an elaborated system of committees composed of national governments officials who scrutinize the Commission’s implementing measures (p.52). Due to these proceedings the legislators can examine the Commission. This procedure created a new amalgamation where the governments exercised both legislative and executive role. The truth is that as the procedures are multiplied the autonomy of the Commission decreases. Since 1999 the Council has the final power to veto; this is a really powerful measure that in no way should be used in vain.
Due to the new circumstances, one would expect the Commission and the Council to be in constant conflict. Although, Dogan (1997, 2000) cited by Hix (2005) found that this was not always the case. As he presents, the 29 percent of all comitology procedures proposed by the Commission between 1987 and 1995 were under procedures where the Commission was not strong, and opposite to the Commission’s elocution about the Council’s antithesis to the advisory committee procedure, though the Council accepted 40 percent of the Commission’s propositions for use of this procedure.
By the time that the EP gained legislative powers, the Maastricht Treaty gave a new turn to an already intricate issue. Dinan (1999) had mentioned that till the Treaty of the EU, the EP had no reason to be involved in the procedure (p.229). The 1999 Decision was an attempt of the Council to eliminate any concern of the Commission and the EP; Nugent (2003) characteristically wrote that “prior to the 1999 decision there had been frequent disputes between the Council on the one hand and the Commission on the other over the nature and application of the procedures” (p.136).
The issue is that despite of more or less active involvement of the Council and the EP in the comitology procedure, the Commission’s freedom in shaping the policies, independently of what the other institutions intentions are, is diminished.

Legislative procedures

The guidelines of the EU legislative process have changed substantially since the Treaty of 1957(Rome) established that legislation would be adopted through interaction between the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. Europe is now more democratic than in the past, but still far from being deeply and true democratic. To reach this point one of the major issues was the re-distribution of power between the Institutions. Through the treaties there has been created a legislative procedure where the Institutions interact and generate the European engine with new policies. Each individual article would be treated differently and in a specific procedure.
The legislative procedure contains four main different types of interaction:

Ÿ the consultation
Ÿ the co-operation
Ÿ the co-decision
Ÿ and the assent.


Desmond Dinan (2004) wrote that on the Maastricht treaty, the EP won another dramatic extension of its legislature role, the co-decision procedure (p.29). This is the latest part of legislation with which the EP acquired legislative authority.

Consultation procedure:

In the Consultation procedure the Commission proposals are passed from the EP for an opinion. The EP may suggest alterations, but the true power of this level is the power of delay. Since the 1980 and after the “Isoglucose Case”, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Council would not act legally if adopted a proposal of the Commission without receiving an opinion of the EP. The ECJ gave to the Parliament significant power after this decision; the de facto power of delay. Since then, the threat of the delay would always have a considerable role in the decision making process.
A characteristic weakness though of this procedure was that the EP was not consulted in all areas. The scenery changed after the Single European Act by initiating the co-operation procedure.


Co-operation procedure:

The SEA enriched the legislative process with the co-operation procedure; due this the Council required Parliamentary agreement in a small number of cases. The Council’s ability to decide was lessen in contrary with the EPs ability to advice. The EP would no longer be spectator in the legislature procedure.
The co-operation procedure consists of two readings: the first is open-ended but the second has a three month deadline which can be extended by one month. Jeremy Richardson (1996) notices that the crucial stage of this procedure is undoubtedly the “common position” (p.98). Due this, if the common position between the Council and the Commission differed markedly from the text considered by the Parliament at the first reading, then the EP should be re-consulted. The common position was the main factor of the co-operation procedure, the Article 146(b) of the SEA clearly defines that both the Council and the Commission should justify to the Parliament the common position they came up with. Though the EP at it second reading has the ability to amend the common position or even reject it by an absolute majority voting. If this happens the Council has to negotiate with the EP in a Conciliation procedure. As Desmon Dinan(1999) mentions, originally the new procedure applied to ten EC Treaty articles, most dealing with the Single market, though the Treaty of Amsterdam virtually abolished it in favor of the Co-decision procedure. After all according to the Prag Report the co-operation procedure was a preparatory stage for the co-decision procedure, where the EP would be enriched with equal legislative power with the Council.
Tsembelis and his coauthors cited by Hix(1999, p.104), consequently argue that the Commission and the EP can influence policy outcomes by proposing amendments that are easier for the Council to accept than to reject.
The co-operation procedure nowadays applies in the field of monetary union because all the other issues are dealt with the co-decision procedure. The legislature process as it can be seen was evolving since 1987 and the classic description of distribution of power between the EU Institutions do not longer apply. Though nowadays, since the Amsterdam Treaty decision-making process has turned in a more teamwork process.

Co-decision procedure:

As defined in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, the co-decision procedure is the legislative procedure which is central to the Community's decision-making system (www.europa.int). The co-decision procedure has undoubtedly changed the set on EU policy making. The role of the European Parliament has significally changed. The present role of the Parliament does not resemble any of the past days; the EP finally obtained much of the power it always seek after.
Under this procedure the policy-making in the EU became much more complicated but interesting though. Through the process the Council and the EP may agree in the first reading and the new legislation is adopted. In case they do not agree in the second reading, then the EP has the opportunity by absolute majority to reject the proposal, which then falls. On the other hand in this stage the EP “may amend the Council’s common position by an absolute majority, in which case conciliation takes place between the Council and the EP” (Helen Wallace & William Wallace,2000,p.22).The conciliation committee is consisting of 25 members from the EP and 25 members of the Council, plus one non-voting representative of the Commission. Although, even the conciliation committee end up in a decision, the results must be approved in a third reading by both the EP and the Council; the EP must approve the third reading by an absolute majority of votes but the Council by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in a six weeks time. (This stage of the process is modified from first being established in the Maastricht treaty; under the first co-decision procedure, if the conciliation committee fails to reach an agreement then the Council could decide by QMV to adopt its common position, unless the EP voted by absolute majority to reject it). Finally if the conciliation committee has not reached an agreement, the proposal falls.
The co-operation between the two Institutions is really essential after the introduction of the co-decision procedure. Though it is not absolutely clear if the Council has more power from the EP or the opposite, especially after the reform of the co-decision procedure. Whereas it is a fact that by removing the power of the Council to act individually after the failure of the conciliation committee to reach an agreement, precluded the Council to manipulate the Parliament.
The significance of the European Parliament have changed since the Treaty of Amsterdam; the turnabout became obvious through the first fall of an EU legislation; the conciliation committee did not succeed in reaching agreement for the voice telephony because of the Council’s intransigence to make concession.

Assent:

A significant procedure in the field of distribution of power in the policy-making process of the EU is the assent procedure. Through this procedure the EP (only) has the power with a single vote to give its approval with absolute majority. The SEA initiated this procedure which applies only in specific issues such as international agreements, enlargement treaties and framework agreements on the structural funds. Stephen George and Ian Bache (2001) wrote that this was simply an extension of the consultation procedure in which the assent of the EP is required for a measure to be adopted (p.226).
With the assent procedure the circle of the Legislative procedure of the EU was concluded. The redistribution of powers between the Institutions came finally in a complete form; with the Nice Treaty last, the Union came through various changes that secures that the Legislative procedure is an operation of all three Institutions.


Institutions in interaction

Martin Westlake and David Galloway (2004) recently wrote that “the union’s Institutions are based on a separation of interests rather than a separation of powers. The European Parliament represents the popular interest, the Commission the general interest and the Council is the forum where the interests of the Member States can be advanced and defended”(p.9).
The distribution of power is now a really complicated issue which shares between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament:

The Commission

The European Commission composed of 25 commissioners and 36 directorates-general is the main executive arm of EU and stand in the heart of the system. It is responsible for:

Ÿ initiating policy proposals,
Ÿ monitoring the implementation of proposals as soon as they have been adopted.
Among other issues, the Amsterdam Treaty revised the directive for the Committees. Some of the changes that have been occurred, were the above:
Ÿ Specific criteria to determine the choice of the committees were specified
Ÿ the procedure became more transparent and,
Ÿ The process was simplified.
Furthermore, the commission “regardless of the legal and political limits that subsidiary imposes, jealously guards its right to propose legislation” (Desmond Dinan,1999,p.224). Main argument in supporting this principle is that the Commission and only can shield EU’s collective interest and prosperity.
Through the legislation procedure the Commission is in conflict with the Council, and often tries to “alter Council’s acts with its implementing legislation” (Desmond Dinan,1999,p.228).Though, even if the Commission is the mainly responsible in proposing legislation, the Council and the Parliament have the right to notify the Commission to look through an issue and create proposals for new laws and policies (the Council under Article 208 of the TEC and the EP under Article 192);. The Council after all, “does not have a totally free hand in what it does”(Neil Nugent,2003,p.126) but neither the Council nor the EP can in initiate a draft proposal themselves.


Under these new circumstances the Commission changed method in approaching the Parliament. A number of practical measures were decided, the most notable (Richard Corbett,2001, p.83) being an administrative reorganization whereby each member of the Commission would appoint a parliamentary “attaché” among the members of his/her cabinet.
The Council finally, apart from the sharing of some of his power with the other Institutions has to take under deep consideration other factors such as the Member States, regional and local authorities, sectional groups, private firms and interests.

The Council

The Councils undertakes both executive and legislative functions; it sets the medium and the long term agenda, and is the dominant chamber in the EU legislative process due to Simon Hix (1999,p.7). The Members States in various cases are trying to impugn the legal base of the Commission either for difference of thesis or for political reasons; there exactly lies the use of the Council.
The cooperation of the Council with the other two Institutions is at some times a one way road; this depends on the policy areas and the type of decisions is needed to be made. The Article 208 of the EU Treaty enriched the Council’s policy initiating role with four factors (Neil Nugent,2003,p.152):

1) The adoption by the Council of an increasingly number of opinion, agreements, resolutions and recommendations. Even though these are not legal texts, they have political weight and are designed to put pressure to the Commission to come up with legislative proposals.
2) The Union’s entry into new political areas where the Treaties cannot act upon. There, only the Council can act.
3) The Councils has been transformed in a well organized mechanism with a strong network, where new policies can be initiated.
4) The Member States are willing to cooperate in spheres where the EU law cannot act with legal agreements. Those agreements are not necessary to be generated by the Commission.
It is also a fact that the pillar one is the chamber were the Council can act less independently in legislation issues. There are two significant reasons for this:

i. In the legislation procedure, it is the Commission that makes the proposals with which the Council can work with, and,
ii. the TEU upgraded the EP in co-legislator with the Council, in the areas it is applied.
The new procedure of the TEU has applied in “half of all directives -the most important legislative measures- since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty”(Neil Nugent,2003,p.152).
In 2001 the Council adopted 137 regulations, 27 decisions and 22 directives on its own, and 23 directives, 13 regulations and 3 decisions through the co-decision procedure together with the EP.

The European Parliament

The EP has numerous powers lying on the legislative procedure. It is the Institution that gained the most new abilities through the reform of the treaties. Some of its powers are to consult, amend, delay, veto and co-decide. The EP also has the right to examine the exercise of executive powers of the Commission and the Council. After all, with all these new elements the modern EP does not really remind the Parliamentary Assembly of the past.
The TEU formally gave to the EP equal to the Council’s authority to submit legislative proposals to the Commission (article 192, former Article 138b, TEC). Nevertheless, even though the Commission is not obliged to put forward a proposal of the EP, after 1995 it agreed to take great account of them.
Following the Treaties the EP has several new opportunities to influence EU legislation:

Ÿ It can influence the Commission in policy-making discussions and propose policy initiatives during the discussions procedure.
Ÿ The other way to initiate legislation ideas is under Article 192 TEC which defines that “The European Parliament may, acting by majority of its members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this Treaty”(TEC).
Ÿ Third, the annual budgetary cycle provides opportunities to exercise legislative influence (Neil Nugent,12003,p.197)
Ÿ And finally, most important, the EP’s legislative power to contribute in the legislative process through: Consultation - Co operation - Co decision and Assent procedures.
The European Parliament under the new legislative power it gained, definitely left back its sole advisor role. The majority of the MEPs though argue that their power should be equal to the National Parliaments, and so they are fighting for even more. Main argument is that a strong EP will give more credentials for EU in the peoples minds.

Conclusion

It is obvious from the above that the EU after the Amsterdam Treaty
does not have a unique
legislature vehicle.
The Treaties have created a process where all three Institutions interact. In certain areas “the Council wields ultimate legislature power, with the Parliament acting in advisory role” (Martin Westlake and David Galloway,2004,p12).
During the last twenty years endless official and unofficial Meetings were debating whether the legislative procedure should change. The today’s form vindicated all those who believed in a better sharing of the powers. The Commission is not the only Institution that can propose as the Council is not the only that decides. Europe is ready to accept this changing and Europeans are ready for even bigger changes; those changes that will bring Europe closer to people.
The European Union needs all these changes that will create a more powerful image. Then it might gain peoples minds and who knows even peoples hearts.

Bibliography:
Books:
Cowles M.G. & Dinan D. (2004). Developments in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire.
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Globalization and European Integration.

Under conditions of security, I will acquire a more complex identity than the idea of tribalism suggests.I will identify myself with more than one tribe;I will be an American, a Jew, an easterner, an intellectual, a professor. Imagine a similar multiplication of identities around the world, and the world begins to look like a less dangerous place.When identities are multiplied, passions are divided.(Walzer 1994:199-200)

From the early Middle Ages Europe existed as a family of cultures, knit by Latin Christianity built on the heritage of the Roman Empire, dynastic intermarriage, the rise of a system of diplomacy and later international treaties (Spohn Willfried&Triantafyllidou Anna, p. 42). Furthermore globalisation, was the main target since the years of colonization; people always wanted to establish relation with the unknown, the “new” always seemed seductive. In the past, this procedure was not “threatening” the National Identities of the Superpowers, because the lines between the civilizations were well drawn.Globalization nowadays, is a contested process where nations, societes and cultures are in deep interrelation; as Wolf characteristically wrote, this continious procedure leads to the formation of a “a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and rounded billiard balls”. Even we wish to simplify the global structure, whether in the form of nations or societies, identity plays a vital but complex role. The construction, ascription, internationalization, refusal or reclaiming of identities continually works behind, below and on the stage of worls politics (Lisbeth Aggestam & Adrian Hyde-Price, p. 29). An important aspect which is obvious focused in the behaviour of EU member-states is that most of them face European integration and globalisation with a different way; those who consider globalization as a threat, doesn’t mean that they feel the same for European integration.
Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou once said that “the idea at the heart of the European social model is the commitment to combine competitiveness and cohesion”; european integration underpins multiculturalism. Even the European model of integration is the most developed in the world, it might content serious implications.

To what extent has the increased influence on policy-making of transnationally constituted actors actually enhanced the quality of democracy in the EU

Looking at Europe today you can see “a cultural complex entity” (Heard-Laureote, 2005, p.50). The European Union “starches from the Atlantic to the Baltic and from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean and is characterized by linguistic and religious density with twenty official languages and five significant religious currents” (Heard-Laureote, 2005, p.51). Moreover, non-governmental organisations, business associations, political parties, multinational companies, media, private interests, informal groups of people, compete to influence policy-making in the European Union (Kaiser & Starie, 2005, p.1). Some of them claim to be more representative, while other claim to be more expert in certain issues. In addition, you can see “hundreds, perhaps even thousands of scholars, commentators, lawyers and politicians who have analyzed European Unions problem” of democratic deficit (Moravscik, 2002, p.604). Though, according to Warleigh “a regime can be defined as democratic if the people, as a collectivity, have the formal power and a number of sufficiently means, through which to authorize the basic process of legislation” (2003, p.81). Or, as Chrysochoou (2001), cited by Warleigh, wrote, a major problem that EU has to face, is how to encourage its citizens to participate actively in the integration process and in the construction of a political defined demos based on civic society (2003, p.16).
An effort to approach and analyze the issues mentioned above would inevitably bring up the issues of transnationalism and transnational actors. Kaiser and Starie (2005, p.1) characteristically wrote that “transnational actors can play a leading role in agenda setting at all levels of domestic, transgovernmental and European politics and policy-making”. Even state actors “rely on them for the - vision thing - because transnational non-state actors” are “detached from the demands of day-today politics, do not depend on electoral support, are not under constant media scrutiny and can often invest more resources into thinking about future” (Heard-Laureote, 2005, p.11). Moreover the European Commission according to Greenwood benefited from the participation of transnational actors in various aspects, such as: “they are a source of support of its role in drafting legislation; they are a means of ‘testing out’ proposals among stakeholders, and the ways these are likely to be received in different national settings ahead of the Council of Ministers; they seek out points of view about them; and for the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, they collate information about the implementation of measures and their impact” (2003, p.5).
‘Transnationalism’, indicates the numerous connections and cooperation between people or institutions across the borders of nations (Vertovec, 2005, p.iii). Transnational actors are developing since the European Coal and Steel Community was established and they are constituted by Business Associations, Professional Interests Associations, Labour Associations, Public Interests Associations and Territorial Interest Associations (Greenwood, 2003, p.v-vi). According to the Secretariat-General of the European Commission (March 2000) there are 900 EU-level Interests groups (Eising, 2003, p.198), while Greenwood cites a number of 1450 formal Interest groups addressed to EU (Greenwood, 2003, p.9).
There are around 950 Business actors in the European Union and constitute the two-thirds of all EU groups (Greenwood, 2003, p.75); five significant Business associations are: the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM-EU), the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), the EUROCHAMBERS and the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME) (Greenwood, 2003, pp.74-122). Furthermore, there are 132 Professional Interest associations (Greenwood, p.124). According to Greenwood, “the professions are the most weakly organised actors at the EU level” (2003, p.124). Moreover, the Trade Union associations represent the three per cent of the formal EU interests groups while the public sector constitute only one per cent of it (Greenwood, 2003, p.19). At last, the Territorial Interests associations represent “both sub-national, regional and local interest representation at the European level” (Greenwood, 2003, p.230).
“The provision of the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union” played principal role in the participation of various groups in the EU arena, “especially those active in Single Market or Environmental policy” (Wessels, 1997, p.20). Lowi’s (1964) axiom “policy makes politics” perfectly describes NGOs evolvement in the European Union (cited by Wallace and Young, 1997, p.238); Wallace and Young wrote that “different actors mobilize in different ways in response to different policy initiatives or predicaments” and this contributes in making clear the existing differences between people’s participation (1997, p.238).
This essay will argue that the quality of democracy within the European Union is enhanced by transnational actors such as Public Interests associations, or Non-governmental organisations as they are broadly described. Though, this essay argues that further improvement of their internal structure and governance would contribute in the greater enhancement of EU’s democracy. Greenwood, Warleigh, Wallace, Youth and Cini among others have extensively analyzed this issue and spread light in a very important subject. Warleigh wrote (2001, p.6190 that “as a strategy for tackling the ’democratic deficit’, attention is increasingly shifting towards the ’Europeanization’ of civil society”. De Tocqueville (1981[1845]), cited by Warleigh (2001, p.620), wrote that “civil society’s return to the center of political discourse has been viewed by liberal political theorist as the means to elaborate a legitimate state structure by limiting its scope and by encouraging or facilitating political engagement by, and mutual solidarity between, otherwise alienated individuals”. Moreover, there are “traditional neo-functionalist explanations, which place the relationship between supranational institutions and organized interests at the center of the European Union” (Greenwood, 2003, p.254). It is the neofunctionalists that have strongly supported that the “involvement of such actors would be a key catalyst in deepening and expanding the Union’s powers”; moreover, they argued that interest groups “could affect public policy and thereby gain a stake in the preservation of both the outputs and system of the Union” (Warleigh, 2006, p.122)
At the first part of this essay an effort will be made to define Public Interests associations and their contribution to the enhancement of the quality of democracy within the EU, as soon as key problems and weaknesses of this process. At the end of the first part the essay will signify some of the factors that could push this process forward and improve EU’s democracy. Furthermore, in the second part of this essay the analysis will focus on the Environmental actors and their role in this process. At last, the conclusion of this essay will summarize the aforementioned issues and point out key subjects that could play an important role in a future development.
The Public interest associations represent the twenty per cent of EU’s formal interest groups (Greenwood, 2003, p.19), while “no systematic consultation” between them and the EU took place until the 1980’s (Cullen cited by Greenwood, 2003, p.180). Public interest associations are “the second largest category of EU interest actors”, at the same time as the European Commission spends one billion euros to support their actions and projects (Greenwood, 2003, p.179); the forty per cent of their activities involve humanitarian aid, human rights, democratisation, external relations etc. (Greenwood, 2003, p.179). “Civil society acts as a mediator between the citizen and the state” (Warleigh, 2001, p.620) and along with what Greenwood has written, the European Union even before the problem of democratic deficit came over, favored to “address this issue” through: encouraging citizen participation, ensuring equality of access and accountability, together with transparency and standards of policy-making (2003, p.6).An excellent example is the “Citizens First!” campaign in 1993, which renamed as “Dialogue with citizens” in 1998, where the Commission’s primary target was to approach EU citizens and public actors with a different perspective and give them the opportunity to feel closer to Europe (Greenwood, 2003, p.176).
Public interest associations are not all concerned with the same issues and problems. There are Environmental groups concerned with environmental issues; Consumer interest actors related with Consumer Policies and Social interest associations, that according to Greenwood, share a closer relation with the European Commission (2003, p.209). An important question that requires an answer early in the analysis of this essay, is why the European Union needs these associations and how these could foster EU democracy? According to Greenwood (2003, p.177), the Public interest actors “foster participatory democracy, and contribute to policy-making” while they “provide valuable information, in both preparing and implementing policy” (Kirchner & Schwaiger, 1981, p.10); they help EU to communicate with its grassroots and they “act as a filter for various national interests in certain sectors” (Kirchner & Schwaiger, 1981, p.10). Even more, along with the European Commission (2000a), Public interest associations contribute to project management, policy programme implementation and even in European integration (Greenwood, 2003, p.177). Non-governmental organisations operate as “guardians of public interests”; they “monitor and assess the performance of political and economic players and respond to their action or inaction” (Global Policy Forum, 2001).
The legitimacy and political accountability of the European Union cannot solely be “limited in increasing the power of the European Parliament” (Kohler-Koch, p.54). Other actors such as regional and environmental, in cooperation with the European Union, enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU’s Policies and Programs (Kohler-Koch, p.54). Moreover, as Warleigh wrote (2001, p.622), NGO’s “contribution to the legitimacy of the Union has thus largely been through helping to produce more broadly acceptable policy outcomes”. The broad support that Public interests groups have gained from the people, can become the necessary vehicle for improving EU’s democratic quality. As Eising (2003, p.193) wrote, these interests groups can be seen as “schools for democracy, that socialize citizens as political beings, and contribute to the formation of a general will, out of the specific concerns of groups”. As Covey (1996) wrote “NGOs often claim to work in alternative ways which socialize and empowers those they serve” (cited by Warleigh, 2006, p.123). Social actors offer the necessary prerequisites for lessening the “gap between the governing and the governed” by increasing people’s knowledge regarding the “purpose, policies and actions of the European Union (Global Policy Forum, 2001). It is because of NGO’s presence in EU policy-making “that a wider range of political activists is aware of EU issues and is attempting to raise broader societal concerns at the EU level than in the past” (Warleigh, 2006, p.122). The latter together with NGO’s “extensive membership”, bring Europe closer to its citizens (Warleigh, 2006, p.122).
The “Brussels Archipelago”, as Wessels (1997, p.19) characterize the “horizontal and vertical channels of actors interaction”, improve the transparency and legitimacy of the European Union’s political system. He wrote (1997, p.20) that:
These actors both promote the integration process and are pulled by an in-built dynamic, based on competition for access and influence in the making of public policies. Thus, endogenous and exogenous dynamics lead to a new kind of European political system: this is characterized by the fusion between instruments, procedures, and networks from several levels of public policies.

An important step towards greater inclusiveness was made in the 1996/7 IGC process; there the Committee of Experts “promoted the idea of a ’civil dialogue’, in parallel with the ‘social dialogue’ which was at that time beginning to produce its first tangible results” (Greenwood, 2003, p.185).
Additionally, an important role that public interest actors play in their effort to enhance the quality of democracy within the EU is the “Europeanization of civil society” (Warleigh, 2001, pp. 635-636); Europeanization is necessary as “a part of the solution to the notorious democratic deficit” (Warleigh, 2001, p.620). This will give EU citizens the necessary social and cognitive background to support the democratisation and generally the integration process of the European Union. The common market, the common money, the development of the periphery and the cohesion funds are important elements of European Union, though the Europeanization of people and the creation of a European awareness is necessary for them to work (Theologou, p.2005, p.7). The process for deeper Europeanization is a process of deep evolution and innovations; NGO’s play an active role in this process. EU membership and participation demands the evolution of basic values of the Societies (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p.7). These values can be inspired and inculcated by active and efficient public organisations. Moreover, Keone (1988) cited by Warleigh (2001, p.620) “has seen the civil society as both the defeat of big government and a means of bringing the citizens back” in the European Union. As long as political parties remain less active in this process, the main responsibility to “bring citizens back” (Keane cited by Warleigh, 2001, p.620) remains to Public interests actors. Aspinwall (1998) cited by Warleigh wrote that “the weakness of political parties at EU level has created an advocacy void that NGOs are well situated to fill (Warleigh, 2006, p.123). Though, Kohler-Kohl (1997, p.54) wrote that “their influence depends on how well they succeed in making a privileged framework for discussion and a center for networking”. Furthermore, Public interest actors take advantage of the “good reputation” they share with the public, and that “makes them credible advocates of engagement with the European Union” (Warleigh, 2006, p.123).
There are a number of European Union’s political actors that encounter Public interest associations as valuable “channels to popular opinion and/or concern which they prioritize more highly than representation from industry” (Warleigh, 2000, p.231). For example, the Parliament and its Members are “the natural ally of social actors, not necessarily because they favour their demands, but because their interests match” (Kohler-Koch, 1997, p.55). MEP’s want to gain as much public interest they can, because in this way they will improve their political influence. As Kohler-Koch wrote “MEP’s and interest groups share an interest in building up their strength and therefore in giving each other support, as numerous case studies about consumer protection, environmental policies and animal protection illustrate” (Kohler-Kocj.1997,p.55). MEP’s interest for Public interests groups gives the latter the opportunity to influence policies and enhance democracy by being in constant contact with the European Parliament.
Though, despite of the important contribution that Public interests groups offer to the enhancement of EU’s democracy, there are various scholars such as Warleigh (2000, 2001, 2006) and Greenwood (2003) who notice some weaknesses in this process. There are internal problems in the administration and governance of those actors that prevent them of being in constant interaction with the Europeans and promote their Europeanization. Public interest associations must overcome their internal democratic weaknesses if they aim in promoting people’s further Europeanization; NGO’s must be keen and competent to “act as agents of political socialisation, with particular reference to EU decision making and policy” (Warleigh, 2001, p.635). At the present time, there is high distance between the people that lead the Public interests associations and their supporters; this does not give them the opportunity to participate in neither policy and action planning nor agenda setting. Moreover, NGOs “must be substantively rather than formally democratic: that is, they must not only have structures which allow supporters to participate in their decision making but their supporters should actively play such a role” (Warleigh, 2006, p.126).
Even more, Eising (2003, p.203) mentioned that “some members of social policy interest groups fear that the support given by EU Institutions is little more than a convenient way for EU to give a human face to the Single Market”.
Cullen (1999), cited by Greenwood (2003, p.178), identified three models of groups-civil society analysis; the first, “sees an emerging civil society from the development of the EU public interest agenda”; the second, exams EU Public interest actors as “an elite, isolated segment whose self-contained dialogue with the Commission does little to enable it to reach out civil society, while the last “identifies element of both contestation and incorporation in the relationship between the Commission and NGO’s”. The role of Social actors might not be the ideal one, though an important work has been done and the process of improvement emerge. In this effort, Social actors need to overcome Europe’s diversity and ‘make’ Europeans believe in Europe and work united with the same hopes and aims. It is of significant importance, the Public interest associations to establish mechanisms that will give an opportunity to “their supporters to play a role in the formation of NGO policy on issues to be tackled in the EU level” (Warleigh, 2001, p.623); Furthermore, an emerging problem that many scholars intend to mention, is the increasing economic dependence of NGO’s from the European Commission and/or others. As Warleigh wrote, “NGOs must be able to call their own tune rather than answer to the priorities of their funders” (2006, p.126) because this might affect their independence and the agenda setting of their actions.
NGO’s have the opportunity to emerge in key factors in the progress of European Unions democratisation. This will happen as soon as NGO’s take over their important role to “educate their supporters about EU policy and structures” (Warleigh, 2001, p.623). Additionally, NGO’s must provide their supporters with the necessary prerequisites for active participation in EU’s policy formation. This will only occur if Social actors open their decision-making process to their supporters and let them participate actively in it; otherwise, “the socialization will be stillborn, with insufficient outlets for the newly raised levels of awareness” (Warleigh, 2001, p.623).
Warleigh (2001, p.635-636) identified a “twin strategy in which NGOs can reform and play a part”: first, the opportunity structures available to NGOs at EU level must be improved and at the same time, the role of civil society in all stages of the legislative chain must be enhanced”. It is significant that “the partnership principle must be exported in all areas of EU activity” (Schott cited by Warleigh, 2001, pp.635-636). Moreover, crucial element towards EU democratisation is “the broad attempt to engage the public and initiate further institutional reform based on sustained public dialogue” (Warleigh, 2001, pp.635-636). NGOs must enhance their “politicization” and their ability to draw on existing political socialization while overcoming their “service delivery” role (Warleigh, 2001, p.634); then they will be able to inspire their participants with the higher cause for which they are established.
In the first part of this essay, an effort has been made to analyze the increased influence on policy-making, of transnational constituted actors, to enhance the quality of democracy within the European Union. This occurs in various ways, such as: broad participation of NGOs in planning and implementation of EU policies, the open dialogue of NGOs with Institutions, etc. Though, the present structure of Social interests groups, face significant weaknesses that need to be revisoled, in an effort to make this process more effective and transparent. Furthermore, the second part of this essay will focus on the Environmental actors and their role in enhancing EU’s democracy.
The European Union is a “world leader in environmental affairs” (Greenwood, 2003, p.189) while “views itself as the logical vehicle for bringing environmentally-proactive new ideas to the negotiations backed with considerable political clout” (Pedler, 2002, p.99). The European Environmental non-governmental organizations have succeeded in overcoming many of the NGO’s problems that this essay presented in the first part; this transformed them in a useful and active ally in EU’s effort for democratisation. Environmental actors succeeded in bringing environmental issues in the center of citizen’s interests; these issues are ‘highly politicized’ and the ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys have repeatedly shown the popularity of the European level to tackle environmental problems” (Greenwood, 2003, p.186). European Environmental NGO’s cooperate in their effort to integrate environment into as many EU Policy areas as possible. Moreover they combine their forces in “adding value to natural resources management, promoting partnership with Civil Society and evaluating progress towards the achievement of sustainable development objectives” (Environmental NGO’s common position, 2004).
EU’s active environmental engagement started in 1972 after a “landmark summit held in Stockholm” (Greenwood, 2003, p.186). Since then, five environmental action programs were implemented, while the sixth ends in 2010 (Greenwood, 2003, p.186). The Environmental NGOs have succeeded in pursuing politicians and citizens that the environmental issues have “no respect of boundaries” and countries (Greenwood, 2003, p.186). Common actions were necessary to face the various problems that EU countries started facing while industrialization was in progress. Moreover, the first important step was taken with the Single European Market that identified the importance of the environmental issues and was “extended by the TEU with the use of QMV and the addition of the precautionary principle” (Greenwood, 2003, p.186).
The European Environmental Bureau was the first active organisation and it “was founded in 1974 to promote the protection of the environment” (Eising, 2003, p.202). In thirty years, it succeeded in including 134 organisations from 25 countries (Greenwood, 2003, p.190). Furthermore, the last 20 years “some 13 environmental organisations and networks” are active at the European Union” (Hey & Brendle, 1994, cited by Eising, 2003, p.202).The eight largest environmental NGO’s are: the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), Greenpeace, the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), Birdlife International, Climate Network Europe (CNE) and Friends of Nature International (INF). The Group of Eight (G8,) according to their data, have 20 million members which represent “at least 5 per cent of the European population” (Greenwood, 2003, p.189); their broad membership helps them to transform as significant and reliable factors for tackling EU’s democratic deficit.
The active participation and the increasing importance of environmental issues led EU to sign the Aarthus Convention “on citizens rights in environmental matters, guaranteeing rights of access to information, public participation in decision making and to justice in environmental matters” (G8 cited by Greenwood, 2003, p.187). The EU’s environmental laws rang between over 200 (WWF, 2002, cited Greenwood, 2003, p.187) to over 700 (Jones, 2002, cited by Greenwood, 2003, p.187).WWF for example, has given great priority in influencing EU environmental policy and legislation and have created a “European Policy Office” with 20 people staff, that aims to relate with the Directorate General for the Environment or the Parliaments Environment, Public Health and Consumer Affairs Committee, among others (Long, Salter & Singer , 2002, p.87). As Greenwood (2003, p.187) characteristically wrote, the environmental Public Interests actors are:
Ηighly capable of engaging policy-making at a scientific level, and their dedication to the cause can give them an advantage over Business associations struggling with a variety of issues in EU policy-making coming at them.
Long, Salter and Singer (2002, pp.89-95), for example, mentioned that in a case of energy source companies, the result was that Business associations like ERT and UNICE were disregarded, despite of the fact that the result had great impact on their interests. Additionally, in other cases, transnational Business actors “collaborate with ‘light green’ interests groups, if there is an agreement of interests” (Greenwood, p.188).
Furthermore, most of the G8 NGOs have succeeded in creating close relations with DG Environment and this gave them the opportunity to "sit on the General Advisory Forum on the Environment and Sustainable Development" (Greenwood, 2003, p. 192). Moreover, they come together with the Cabinet of DG Environment every “six to eight weeks” and “once a year” with the President of the Commission (Greenwood, 2003, p. 192). These gave them, apart from credibility towards their members, the opportunity to influence policy-making and bring EU closer to its grassroots. The “establishment of a structured dialogue between organised civil society and the different levels of government” is the necessary precondition for enhancement EU’s democracy. (“Democracy, Governance”, April 20th, 2006). For example, Greenpeace in a campaign over the drinking water directive “achieved an EP amendment about pesticide limits which the Commission accepted despite the opinions of its own scientific adviser (Warleigh, 2002, cited by Greenwood, 2003, p.194). Or, on the other hand, WWF took the initiative to actively influence issues such as “the clean development mechanism”, “reducing carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels” etc. (Long, Salter, singer, pp.88-103).
Furthermore, the Environmental NGOs despite of some weaknesses such as intense EU funding - Greenpeace is the sole Environmental NGO that do not receive any funding from the European Commission - have succeeded in “engaging policy-making through formulation, implementation and monitoring” (Greenwood, 2003, p.196). They have also succeeded in motivating million of peoples to “care” about EU environment and “helped to shape not only the thinking of policy actors such as the Commission and producer groups, but also Member States preferences towards Environmental protection policies” (Greenwood, 2003, p.196). Environmental NGOs have succeeded a fundamental precondition for tackling EU’s democratic deficit: they transformed all environmental issues as subjects for common discussion between EU citizens while they gave them the opportunity to act.
The aim of this essay was to examine the extend that the increased influence on policy-making of transnationally constituted actors enhance the quality of democracy within the EU. It was argued, in the first part, that transnational constituted actors such as Public interest associations enhance the quality of democracy within the EU. Though, as it was argued, greater enhancement and effectiveness could be succeeded if NGOs improve their internal structure by succeeding: greater independence, improvement of the internal democratic structure, improvement of their perceptive influence on members and supporters, and as Warleigh wrote (2001, p.632) greater concentration on the Politicization of their supporters rather than Service Delivery. Moreover, the second part of this essay focused its analysis on Environmental transnational actors that is claimed by numerous scholars, such as Greenwood, to be the most active among Public interests associations. Environmental actors, their action in policy-making, legislation and effective representation were some of the issues that were analyzed in this part.
As Vivien Schmidt (2004, p.977) wrote, “democracy in the European Union should not only concern government by the people but also government of the people or government with the people through contact interaction with organized interests”. The White Paper in the European Governance, originated in 2001, was focused in the way that EU treats the powers that is given by its citizens. As the White Papers declares: “reform must be started now, so that people see changes before further modification of the EU Treaties” (p.3). The White Paper aims in promoting good governance by five steps: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (p.10). The European Union need to give people an opportunity for greater involvement that will end up in greater responsibility and effectiveness of policy implementation. Even more, the White Paper promoted consultation and dialogue between EU and Interest associations; this will give civil society the opportunity to play an important role by “giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people’s needs” (White Paper, 2001, p.30). Furthermore, it is significantly essential in lessening EU’s problem of democratic deficit, important decision to be taken (Global Policy Forum, 2001): European Union’s reform effort must, on the one hand, include “stronger structured civil dialogue” and on the other hand, should aim in “further improvement of non-governmental organisations” (Global Policy Forum, 2001).

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